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MENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT INDICATORS OF DEVELOPMENT 1 
SUMMARY1 
 
This paper consists of two parts: the first takes a critical look at the 
decision by Statistics South Africa to increase the frequency of the 
Labour Force Surveys (LFSs) from bi-annual to quarterly, while the 
second looks at new ways in which the information on employment and 
unemployment collected in the LFSs can be presented and analysed. 
 
As far as the doubling of the number of LFSs conducted yearly is 
concerned, the approach is to examine the usefulness of the indicators 
that emerge from surveys similar to the LFS in much-developed countries 
like Canada, the US and the UK. Posing the question of why it is 
considered appropriate to ape the data-gathering patterns of such 
countries, it is concluded that the ‘user demand’ which prompted the 
increase in the frequency of the survey, is unlikely to have been based in 
any rigorous analysis of the slight (and possibly misleading) contribution 
the resulting figures may make to policy formation or business decision 
making. If either the business community or government wants 
information of this sort, it is argued, they should commission research 
which shows why and how it is more useful than other urgently-needed 
surveys. 
 
In place of the quarterly LFS, two steps are proposed. The first is the 
emulation of a survey of business enterprises in the US which measures 
labour demand (this would replace the present inadequate questions on 
hires and separations sought in the Quarterly Employment Statistics). The 
second is a closer alignment of the two LFSs currently conducted with the 
General Household Survey (GHS), a step which would not only go some 
way towards meeting a demand for more frequent labour market 
information, but one that would also improve the quality of the 
information available for understanding poverty and inequality in South 
Africa. 
 
Taking a critical look at the employment and unemployment figures 
published by Statistics South Africa, mainly in the bi-annual Labour 
Force Surveys (LFSs), the paper suggests new ways in which the 
information collected can be presented and analysed. The aim is to reduce 
the frequency of misleading and/or exaggerated responses to aggregate 
movements in both sets of indicators. 
 
The paper proposes as well, improvements in the collection of data on 
networking and educational attainment, both apparently significant 
determinants of the probability of obtaining employment. 
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A device for integrating the analysis of employment and unemployment 
performances is proposed. It is intended to act as a guide, offering a set of 
provisional judgements of the various possible outcomes, judgements 
which need to be qualified by detailed analysis of all of the relevant 
aspects of any particular outcome. By all ‘relevant aspects’ is meant a 
movement from the highly aggregated to the disaggregated, where one 
understands the latter to mean broken down by type of household 
becoming employed or unemployed, by gender, and by type of work 
obtained, and by any other variable or characteristic that may be 
suggested. 
 
The paper concludes with a set of specific recommendations drawn from 
the analysis. 
 
An appendix, containing selected ‘Inflation outlook’ predictions made by 
the South African Monetary Policy Committee, a group whose 
unenviable task it is to help thrash out a consensus position on the desired 
level of the repo rate, shows that in recent times, their optimism in the 
efficacy of this tool (the repo rate) in driving inflation into the target 
range of 3-6 percent per annum, has been somewhat less than justified. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1999, the last of the October Household Surveys, an instrument that 
not only provided comprehensive labour market and other information, 
but which was also intended to enable questions of poverty to be 
addressed, was conducted. Its place was taken by two surveys, the Labour 
Force Survey and the General Household Survey. The first round of the 
LFS (a rotating panel survey) took place in February 2000 and the first 
GHS was conducted in July 2002. At the time of writing Version 4 of the 
paper (April 2008), results (and data) for the LFSs for the period 
February 2000 to September 2007 (16 rounds in all) had been published. 
Matching of households in the LFS, which, because of confidentiality 
requirements, must be carried out by Statistics South Africa, lags quite a 
long way behind the publication of the survey results. This means that 
(longitudinal) analysis of labour market dynamics, the ostensible reason 
for the switch from the OHS to the LFS, could at present be too out-of-
date to be of much use to policymakers. 
 
Statistics South Africa plans to increase the frequency of the LFSs from 
two to four each year. Such a step, it is argued, is not justified―the 
expected gains from the additional data to be gathered are likely to be far 
outweighed by the cost of collecting them. An alternative is proposed 
which would see two LFSs each year, conducted in February and 
October. If the questions on labour market status, income and expenditure 
in the LFSs and the GHS are properly aligned, Statistics South Africa 
could, with minimal sacrifice of quality of information, provide users 
with a much better service than that proposed under the new 
arrangements. In addition to improved service on the labour market 
information front, critical questions for poverty and inequality in the 
LFSs could be addressed using the pooled data of two large, independent 
household surveys. 
 
Whatever use employment and unemployment statistics may have as 
instruments to help formulate policy or to inform business decisions, 
readers should hardly need reminding that such numbers are intensely 
political. In the highly-charged atmosphere of the debate over South 
Africa’s growth path, and in particular, in the light of government’s 
commitment to the achievement of the ‘social objectives’ of halving 
unemployment and poverty by 2014 (AsgiSA, 2006, p.2), labour market 
statistics have acquired an importance well beyond their modest ability to 
assist in decision-making. 
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In recent times, the official statistics on employment have been a comfort 
to the ruling party in South Africa. In his 2007 State of the Nation 
Address, for example, the President said that: 
 
‘Over the past three years, the economy has created some one-and-half 
million jobs. It is encouraging that in the year March 2005 to March 
2006 alone, 300 000 of the jobs created were in the formal sector 
outside of agriculture…’ 
 
In similar vein, the Minister of Finance, delivering the 2007 Budget (on 
21st February 2007), claimed that: ‘… the economy is creating about 500 
000 jobs a year…’ (Budget Speech, 2007, p.9). 
 
The problem with these claims is that at the time they were uttered, they 
were not supported by the available evidence. When the speeches from 
which the statements above are taken were delivered, the latest available 
Labour Force Survey employment figures were for March 2006 
(Statistical release P.0210, 26th September 2006). Examining performance 
over the period 2000-2007 in greater detail below (see Table 3), we will 
see that the average is buffeted this way and that by the erratic behaviour 
of the estimates of employment in the informal economy, especially in 
subsistence and/or informal agriculture. If one ignores these figures 
altogether, the best performance that can be wrung out of the LFSs was 
job growth averaging 407 000 a year over the period September 2002 to 
September 2005. The March 2003 to March 2006 average for the 
economy as a whole, excluding subsistence or informal agriculture was 
297 000 jobs per annum. 
 
Unwarranted though the claims were when made, more positive news lay 
in the future―the September 2006 to September 2007 figures, for 
example, saw an encouraging 630 000 extra jobs in the economy as a 
whole, of which just over 400 000 were in the formal sector. Growth in 
employment was sufficient to bring the official unemployment down 
from the level of 25-26 percent where it had hovered since September 
2004, to 23 percent. The expanded unemployment rate, which peaked at 
42.4 percent in March 2003, fell to 35.8 percent by September 2007. If 
growth at this rate could be maintained, hopes of meeting the country’s 
modest goal of halving the official unemployment rate by the year 2014,2 
could be entertained. Assuming that the base year from which the 
unemployment halving was to take place is 2003, and the variable in 
question is the official rate of unemployment, neither of which can 
necessarily be taken for granted, then to achieve a rate of 14 percent in 
2014 (half of the 28 percent at which it stood in September 2003), the 
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number of jobs to be created in each year after 2007 is about 550 000.3 
Despite repeated assertions that the ‘macro-fundamentals are sound’, 
extrapolating the growth experienced in South Africa in the past couple of 
years into an increasingly fragile-looking future is the sort of game that 
only the terminally optimistic should play. 
 
Not long after the celebration reported above of the economy’s fine 
growth performance, news of a more sobering sort began to fill the press. 
It came on a variety of fronts―financial sector woes; the energy crisis; 
inflation, a slowdown in manufacturing, and increased political 
uncertainty, being the most significant.4 South Africa’s financial sector 
may be shielded from some of the wilder excesses that are threatening the 
stability of the international financial system, but even so, growth is 
expected to slip to about three to four percent from the five percent per 
annum achieved in recent years.5 With recession in the US6 a strong 
likelihood (the UK may escape with a mere slowdown in the rate of 
growth),7 the danger of the contagion spreading worldwide is apparently 
staved off only by strong growth in emerging giants China and India. A 
combination of slack regulatory systems,8 and the growth of ever more 
complex derivative instruments, seems to have encouraged some banks to 
treat lending as if it were taking place in an accountability-free zone 
(Gieve, 2008, p.6).9 Direct intervention by the Federal Reserve Bank in 
the US, and the Bank of England in the UK, to save a few of the less 
prudent (because the cost of allowing them to collapse is perceived as 
unacceptable), although defended as ‘exceptional’, carries with it the risk 
of encouraging further permissive behaviour, if bankers believe they will 
be ‘rescued’. No doubt capitalism will ultimately pull itself up by the 
bootstraps (ready to lurch on to the next crisis), but the consequences for 
South Africa, although not easy to predict, could be dire.10 
 
While greed, hubris and folly of truly staggering proportions were busy 
creating the pre-conditions for economic crisis in capitalism’s heartlands, 
not all South Africans were idle. Some, in positions of authority, were 
busy (passively) undermining the much-vaunted fundamentals by failing, 
amongst other things, to invest in the electricity-generating capacity 
required to support the aimed-for growth rate of six percent per annum. 
The implications of the gross mishandling of electricity supply, from 
provision of capacity from sustainable sources, to procurement of coal 
supplies, and to the application of employment equity (affirmative 
action), will be felt for many years to come. 
 
Inflationary pressures, exacerbated by increases in the price of petroleum, 
have pushed the inflation rate well outside the Reserve Bank’s target of 3-
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6 percent per annum (and will soon make themselves felt in electricity 
supply as well, if the rate hikes applied for by Eskom are granted). The 
February 2007 to February 2008 change in the CPIX (the CPIX is a 
monetary policy target), was 9.4 percent. Leading the way were increases 
in food and transport prices of 14.1 percent each (Statistical release 
P0141, 26 March 2008, p.3). Undergirding the increases in the CPI were 
even larger increases in the production price index (PPI). For the same 
period, the PPI grew at the rate of 11.2 percent, dragged upwards by, 
amongst other things, imported commodities, whose prices rose by 15.9 
percent over the year (Statistical release P0142.1, 27 March 2008, p.1). 
Although the South African Reserve Bank’s Monetary Policy Committee 
has been persistently optimistic, inflation has apparently been impervious 
to the increases in the repo rate that have been made since renewed 
pressures started to make themselves felt in mid-2006 (the rate has been 
pushed up from seven percent in April 2006 to 11 percent in December 
2007).11 
 
Manufacturing output, having started to grow after 2003,12 appears to be 
faltering. Responsible in 2006 for about 18 percent of gross value added 
and a bit less than 14 percent of total employment in the same year,13 the 
sector might have contracted for the second month in a row, according to 
analysts using the Investec Purchasing Manager’s Index (PMI). In 
February 2008, this fell to the lowest level it had seen since June 2003 
(see the article ‘Manufacturing activity at lowest in five years’ by Mariam 
Isa in Business Day, online edition, 2 April 2008).14 The article, a 
generally gloomy piece, also points out that business confidence slipped 
to a seven-year low in the first quarter of 2008. Its growth forecast for 
2008 for the economy as a whole is 3-4 percent. A few years of that sort 
of performance will put paid to any dreams of halving unemployment, 
less still, poverty. 
 
Since animal spirits enter importantly into investment decisions, the 
political upheaval at Polokwane has added to the gloom. That event, 
which saw ANC party activists (the ANC in conference) effectively 
created a second centre of power to challenge the ANC in government, 
turned a press on guard against ‘populism’, into one that is actively 
suspicious of much of the ANC’s new leadership, further complicating 
the investment climate. Much of the pressure on the leadership of the 
ANC in government turned on the argument that not enough was being 
done about poverty and unemployment. What lies ahead for the poor is, 
however, not clear. One commentator on Zuma’s ascendancy to the 
Presidency of the ANC, observed that ‘In South Africa, the official 
opposition is not the Democratic Alliance, it’s the financial markets’ (see 
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Meth, 2008, pp.23-24). Repeated claims that policy is not about to change 
in the post-Polokwane period have done little to reassure that opposition. 
 
Politicians, it can be claimed with some confidence, are probably never 
pessimistic about matters over which they exercise, or aspire to exercise, 
control, unless it is expedient to for them to be so. It falls therefore, to 
external critics (or courageous underlings) to speak out when indicators 
that are capable of measuring socio-economic performance are pushed 
beyond their elastic limits. If employment (and unemployment) statistics 
are to function as trustworthy indicators of development, or the lack 
thereof, rather than as the means for creating sound bites, then serious 
engagement with the form in which the numbers collected by the regular 
household surveys, in particular, the Labour Force Surveys (LFSs), are 
presented, is necessary. This paper offers some suggestions as to how the 
survey results may be used so as to convey as much useful information as 
possible to users. Revisions to improve the quality of the information 
collected in the LFS on job search and education are also presented. 
 
PART I: IS A QUARTERLY LFS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
NECESSARY? 
 
Statistics South Africa is increasing the frequency of the LFS from two to 
four each year. There is an obvious need for more debate than has so far 
taken place, on the question of the contribution that indicators drawn 
from the proposed quarterly LFSs can make to the policy-making and 
business decision-taking climate. A few ways to engage this debate exist, 
none of them ideal. The most desirable: direct evidence of the 
incremental improvement that quarterly (or even more frequent) labour 
market information makes to the suite of indicators on which decision-
makers act, is extremely hard to find. The approach adopted here is, 
perforce, roundabout. After looking at the reasons offered for the change, 
we speculate as to the identity of those most likely to demand quarterly 
LFS figures, and move from there to a consideration of the potential uses 
of such figures. Two are identified: (i) as inputs into inflation forecasting 
models, and (ii) as inputs into composite economic indicators. 
 
Two reasons for increasing the frequency of the surveys have been 
advanced: 
 
1. The need for ‘exceptionally’ timely data on changes in the state of 
the economy. This has two components: 
• An increase in the frequency of the survey. 
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• A reduction in the lag between collection of data and publication of 
the survey results. The timely appearance of indicators such as 
those churned out by the LFSs will, it is claimed, facilitate policy 
responses to changing economic (and social?) conditions. Both 
changes are said to be in response to user demands, although some 
users objected that the resources and energy to be devoted to the 
proposed ‘improvements’ could be better spent elsewhere.15 
2. To improve survey quality by creating stable employment 
conditions for its team of enumerators―the change from two short 
spells each year to full-time employment will improve the quality 
of the surveys, as the enumerators gain skills and experience. 
 
There is merit in the second of these arguments, although whether a 
quarterly LFS is necessarily the way to achieve the desired goal, is a 
matter for debate, one to which we shall return below. As far as the first is 
concerned, it could be argued that in a matter as important (and costly) as 
this, that it is not unreasonable to call upon the official statistics producer 
to explain in more detail, why it is felt necessary to agree to user demands 
that it take this step. Defending the decision, an internal Statistics South 
Africa document,16 asserts the increased relevance of the more timely 
results for policymaking. The author of the document claims that: 
 
‘In countries with timely quarterly or monthly labour force surveys, 
these surveys are widely taken by business, government and organized 
labour as trusted leading indicators17 of changes in the direction of the 
labour market and hence in the economy.’ 
 
No evidence is offered of how the survey results actually enter the 
process of decision making in these countries, nor with what effect. In the 
absence of this, and not having been present at the Statistics South Africa 
user workshop in March 2006, it is necessary to trawl through the 
literature to see how defensible a ‘user demand’ position is. We begin by 
asking who the users might be who will make use of such indicators, 
leading or otherwise, that emerge from the surveys. 
 
Implicit in the notion of ‘use’ are several meanings: someone who reads 
the survey results with the sole intention of being informed is a statistics 
user; so too is a policymaker, who, in response to the information 
presented (with or without other corroborating evidence) introduces, or 
changes existing policies. Between these extremes lie users, like trades 
unions, for example, who can attempt to mobilise constituencies around 
trends they detect in the numbers. 
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Given that the scarce resources at the disposal of a national statistics 
office have many claims upon them, to which user demands should the 
office pay most attention? While a well-informed citizenry is a national 
asset, meeting their probably limitless demands (wouldn’t it be interesting 
if we knew more about this, that or the other?) cannot rank above those of 
other actors whose decisions may have significant welfare implications 
for the populace at large. Clearly, government has a prior claim. Not far 
behind government is the business community. We need, however, to be 
more specific, posing the questions: what arms of government? what 
sectors of the business community? 
 
Dealing with the latter first, it could be argued that the business 
community needs two types of labour information from a survey such as 
the LFS. The first is information of employment patterns by industry; the 
second, a set of aggregate figures that provide an indication of the overall 
health of the economy. As far as the first of these goes, the sectoral 
employment estimates in the LFS are almost certainly too highly 
aggregated to provide detailed guidance to employers in any particular 
sector. Whether or not aggregate employment and unemployment 
changes can satisfy the second requirement is a matter we address in the 
second half of the paper―to jump ahead in our story, the answer 
is―probably not. 
 
In the case of government, it would comforting to think that between 
them, the Departments of Labour, of Trade and Industry, of Social 
Development, and the National Treasury (and possibly a few other 
departments) had the capacity to respond to adverse (cyclical?) 
conditions, to whose detection the LFSs are expected to contribute.18 
Scanning the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa 
(AsgiSA) documents, probably the most complete catalogue of 
government and other initiatives, it is difficult to see where policy could 
be adjusted to cope with, say, an anticipated increase in unemployment.19 
Beyond certain planned limits (e.g., the expansion of the police services) 
government is opposed to the creation of public sector employment. The 
Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP), boasts about its 
achievements notwithstanding, is trivially small by comparison with the 
problem it seeks to address, and could not, in any event, be expanded 
much further, given existing capacity constraints.20 It is difficult to 
imagine how the programmes of the Department of Labour, concerned as 
they are primarily with skills training and the fostering of learnerships, 
could be expanded at relatively short notice. 
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Social grants in South Africa are categorical (e.g., the child support grant, 
the old age pension, disability grants); their reach could not be expanded 
without legislative changes. Discretionary increases in the grants to the 
indigent (a municipal responsibility) are possible but difficult, given the 
huge numbers that qualify as indigent (van Ryneveld et al, 2003). In any 
event, with certain exceptions, government is as strongly opposed to the 
extension of the social grant system (ANC, 2007)21 as it is to allowing 
itself to slip into the role of employer of last resort. 
 
Nothing said above may be taken as suggesting that certain politicians 
and senior officials in a few departments are not avidly interested in the 
LFS results―they almost certainly are. Rather, the point of the argument 
is to suggest that there is precious little they can do in response to the 
figures―making these into a report of conditions a mere month, rather 
than six months ago, as is presently the case, will not alter their ability or 
capacity to intervene in any significant way. 
 
One policy-making body does, however, stand out as being capable of 
using information from the LFSs as an input into its policy-making 
processes, the South African Reserve Bank (SARB).22 In line with 
contemporary practice, the bank, whose mission statement proclaims that: 
 
‘It regards its primary goal in the South African economic system as 
‘the achievement and maintenance of price stability’. (Emphasis in 
original) 
 
enjoys a significant degree of autonomy in the wielding of the most 
important policy tool at its disposal, the ability to set interest rates. A 
brief examination of the way in which central banks go about doing so, 
offers us a rare insight into the way that policy is actually made, using 
statistics. 
 
Before we turn to that, it is worth mentioning that the bank drags behind 
it, on its coat-tails as it were, that part of the business community 
involved in money markets. Hanging on to every utterance made by the 
Governor of the Reserve Bank (an almost universal phenomenon), the 
financial sector places its bets on varying combinations of the advice 
from the models which it too constructs, some of them also presumably 
using labour indicators, and the hunches of its dealers. How important 
‘timely’ LFS figures are to them is difficult to determine. Let us look 
instead at the Reserve Bank. 
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Forging consensus out of a suite of model results 
A recent paper by Smal et al (2007), describes the core model on the 
basis of which the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) arrives at its 
recommendations on the desired level of the ‘official nominal short-term 
interest rate’, the major tool through which the monetary policy of 
inflation targeting is pursued. Our concern here is not so much with the 
details of the core model, but rather with (a) the performance of the 
Bank’s core model relative to other models that are available and (b) the 
extent to which the forecasts of any or all of the models compare with 
actual experience. When we move away from South Africa to look at the 
similar processes that take place in Britain and the US, we will also be 
able to compare the performance of complex models which make use of 
labour indicators as inputs, with simple models that do not. 
 
The core model has to satisfy the following conditions: 
 
• ‘It must ‘provide a reasonable representation of the South African 
economy, 
• [T]he set of equations describing the economy should enable the 
preparation of internally consistent forecasts (i.e. true structural 
interdependencies) and externally consistent forecasts (i.e. 
reflecting the actual course of macro processes in the South African 
economy). 
• In addition, the model’s structure should also allow information 
from outside the model (i.e. expert judgement) to be incorporated.’ 
(Smal et al, 2007, p.2. Emphasis added) 
 
The only LFS result used by the Bank in its core model is the 
unemployment rate. This enters the model via a wage equation which 
makes use of an expectations-augmented Phillips-curve approach to the 
problem (Smal et al, 2007, pp.11-12). Two other pieces of labour market 
information are used in the model. One is the level of formal non-
agricultural employment; the other is average remuneration per worker at 
current prices. Commenting on the information available to the model’s 
builders, Smal et al observe that: 
 
‘Lengthy, uninterrupted and compatible time series data on the overall 
South African labour market are unavailable, as coverage of especially 
the informal and agricultural sectors is limited. The data used in the 
model cover the enterprise-surveyed formal nonagricultural sectors, as 
published by Statistics South Africa.’ (2007, p.6) 
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It does not seem unreasonable to ask whether an LFS (of whatever 
frequency) can ever deliver satisfactory estimates of informal and 
agricultural employment? It is also reasonable to ask whether reliable 
income estimates can be obtained from household surveys, for those 
sectors of the economy not reached by enterprise surveys, especially the 
informal economy? The answers to these questions are of some 
importance in determining whether or not the expenditure entailed in 
conducting a quarterly LFS is justifiable. 
 
On the first of the two aspects of the performance of the core model in 
which we are interested, Smal et al provide a table showing the errors in a 
four-quarters ahead forecast of the consumer price index from the core 
model, based as it is on quarterly data, and three others, all based on 
monthly data (Table 2, p.23). The forecasts were all upwardly biased, 
those of the core model least so. To the unschooled observer, however, 
the differences, seem small. To evaluate the core model’s performance 
against actual reported inflation, the authors present, in Figure 4 of their 
paper, an ex-post simulation (a retrospective forecast) of inflation over 
nine quarters. For seven of these the core model does remarkably well, 
but by the eighth quarter the forecast is about half a percentage point 
above actual, and in the ninth quarter, almost a full percentage point 
(Smal et al, 2007, p.24). Two exogenous factors throw it off-balance, 
assumptions about the oil price and the real effective exchange that do not 
accord with actual conditions. 
 
What would be of great interest is the results of a set of sensitivity tests 
which compare the effects of being wrong about a variety of inputs into 
the model, both those which use locally-generated data, as well as those 
about which assumptions have to be made (like the oil price). If that were 
done, it would be possible to make a rational evaluation of the relative 
importance of the inputs which could be extracted from an LFS. 
 
So much for the South African Reserve Bank’s core model―let us travel 
now to the UK and the US where similar approaches to monetary policy 
are used. Given that the modeling techniques used by central banks is 
relatively young, having developed since the vogue for granting central 
bank’s an autonomy which places them beyond the reach of democratic 
forces,23 the literature is only now starting to now starting to reflect on 
the performance of the models. The Bank of England, for example, 
published an article evaluating the performance of its suite of models in 
May 2007 (Kapetanios et al, 2007). Some of the models in the suite 
(there were 21 models in its 2006 version, p.27) were constructed or 
modified after a 2003 review pointed to the fact that although well suited 
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to policy analysis, existing models were less suited to inflation 
forecasting (Kapetanios et al, 2007, p.6). Excellent reading though the 
article makes for anyone interested in how statistics enter into this 
important aspect of policy formation (the model’s results are pooled to 
yield a ‘fan’ of results from which members of the UK Monetary Policy 
Committee can select what seems to each of them the most likely 
outcome), our interest here is restricted to a few observations drawn from 
the piece. The first of these is reproduced in the longish passage below: 
 
‘It has to be noted … that forecasting macroeconomic variables is 
hard: beyond a few quarters, it is difficult to beat the unconditional 
mean. Data typically has some obvious short-run cyclical variation 
which has to be accounted for, but (as already observed) it is often 
possible to capture this with a simple AR [autoregressive] process. 
This is easy to understand. Stock and Watson (2005) point out that the 
well-documented move towards macroeconomic stability, sometimes 
referred to as the “Great Stability”, has made forecasting more easy in 
the sense that macroeconomic variables stray less far from the 
unconditional mean than in the past; but more difficult in the sense 
that it is hard to outperform naïve models. Stock and Watson (2005) 
examine this for US inflation. 
 
On the one hand, inflation ... has become much less volatile, so the 
root mean squared error of even naïve or relatively poor forecasts 
had declined since the mid-1980s. ... Inflation has become easier to 
forecast. On the other hand, the relative improvement of standard 
multivariate forecasting models, such as the backwards-looking 
Phillips curve, over a univariate benchmark has been smaller ... 
since the mid-1980s than before. ... It has become much more 
difficult for an inflation forecaster to provide value added beyond a 
univariate model. 
 
The message is that a good test of a forecasting model is whether it 
can beat a simple regression.’ (Kapetanios et al, 2007, pp.6-7) 
 
When it comes to evaluating the performance of the models, the very 
simplest of them, the Unconditional Mean, which, a priori, is ‘unlikely to 
perform well at short horizons’ (p.9), is excluded from the comparison 
exercise―the fact that it uses ‘different information sets’ from the other 
models in the suite render comparisons invalid (p.26). The benchmark 
against which the tests are performed is ‘a simple autoregressive (AR) 
process (where the model is a combination of past values of the variable 
being forecast).’ The authors report that: 
 
‘Over our sample the AR forecasts are hard to beat, especially for 
inflation, with most of the models doing worse for most periods, 
although two non-linear models do better at most horizons. However, 
the benchmark combinations can beat the AR at many horizons for 
both growth and inflation.’ (Kapetanios et al, 2007, p.5) 
 
Producing the combinations from among the vast array of models 
produced by the Bank of England (BoE), is an elaborate business, 
involving much experimentation (Kapetanios et al, 2007, pp.22-26). If 
more is better, then the BoE approach is superior to that of the SARB, 
which appears to be using a single core model (capable, of course, of 
accommodating a multitude of assumptions). The SARB core model 
outperforms an ARIMA (autoregessive integrated moving average) model 
based on monthly data, but we are given no information on the ARIMA 
model. The obvious question to ask is whether the removal of the single 
piece of LFS data that now resides in the SARB core model 
(unemployment rates) would significantly alter this performance. As will 
be shown in the second part of the present paper, the (official) 
unemployment rate, by itself, is not a particularly meaningful indicator. 
 
In the US (and presumably elsewhere as well), a debate on the virtues of 
combined forecasts (and the means of combining models) similar to that 
referred above has taken place. A recent paper by Clark and McCracken 
(2007), for example, treading over some of the same ground as 
Kapetanios et al, looks at the ‘analytical, Monte Carlo, and empirical 
evidence on the effectiveness of combining forecasts from nested 
models.’ Their analytic approach, they observe a little further on: 
 
‘… captures the practical reality that the predictive content of some 
variables of interest is often quite low.’ (p.1) 
 
Our purpose here is not to consider the virtues of combined forecasts, it is 
to inquire whether the addition of certain variables improves model 
performance. If the official unemployment rate (in South Africa) is one of 
those variables whose ‘predictive content’ is low, then the effort 
expended is collecting more of the same is wasteful. 
 
It is as well to avoid the literature on the relative merits of different ways 
of forecasting, if one can. The verdict at which Kapetanios et al (2007) 
and Clark and McCracken (2007, pp.20-21) arrive on the merits of 
combined forecasts is not the subject of universal agreement. A paper 
published the year before by Ang et al (2006) claims that in the US, 
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surveys outperform a host of models, both single and combined. Three 
surveys are considered; the Livingston, which polls economists from 
government, business and academia twice yearly, the Society of 
Professional Forecasters (SPF), mainly from business, on a quarterly 
basis, and the Michigan, a monthly survey which asks householders ‘to 
estimate expected price changes over the next twelve months’ Ang et al 
(2006, p.5). SPF participants are likely to be modellers themselves, as 
will some of those taking part in the Livingston. Ang et al say, however, 
that the way in which they make the evaluation creates a bias against the 
surveys (2006, p.8). Yet they conclude, in an exuberant manner not often 
seen in academic work, ‘Surveys consistently deliver superior inflation 
forecasts!’ (2006, p.28). 
 
What one is to make of this is not all that clear. If it is true that in South 
Africa, the users with the greatest interest in indicators that could be 
drawn from the LFSs on a quarterly basis, are the SARB and the business 
community, and that their over-riding interest is that of forecasting 
inflation, then one would like to see evidence that they have applied their 
minds to the question of the contribution that such additional information 
could make to their forecasts. 
 
It turns out to be the case though, that the Reserve Bank has not 
demanded that Statistics South Africa increase the frequency of the 
surveys. Quite a bit of the other information of which the Bank makes 
use, e.g., the national accounts, appears on a quarterly basis, so the Bank 
is not antipathetic in principle to the idea of quarterly LFSs. The Bank’s 
head of economic research has, however, offered the assurance that there 
has been no pressure from his office for a change to quarterly surveys.24 
 
Apart from government departments that may be indulging in the 
delusion that more frequent surveys would put them in a better position to 
design and implement policy, that leaves only the business community as 
the possible source of demand for more frequent LFSs. My initial 
judgement on this matter still holds―if this (or any other) group is the 
primary source of pressure for a shift to a quarterly cycle, then they 
should be required to produce evidence, of suitable academic standard, 
that shows how such data would improve their performance. Once such 
information is to hand, the relative costs and benefits of devoting scarce 
resources to this, as opposed to other, competing uses could be addressed. 
 
Continued reliance on a single tool, interest rate manipulation, as the 
major instrument of monetary policy, may be unavoidable in the current 
international political climate. It seems to be generally agreed that this 
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relatively crude tool operates with a lag of at least 12-18 months. As the 
selection of ‘Inflation outlooks’ culled from statements by the South 
African Monetary Policy Committee and presented below in Appendix 1 
suggests, the actual course of inflation has been incorrectly predicted in 
the past year or so. It may well be that in the fullness of time, the 
prediction of inflation made by the Committee in the most recent of its 
statements to be published before the present article was completed, 
namely, that for 17th January 2008, that ‘… CPIX inflation is … expected 
to decline to below the upper end of the target range by the final quarter 
of 2008’, comes to pass. Then again, it may not―the performance at this 
point in its history, of the model responsible for the forecast, could hardly 
be described as encouraging. Whatever the model’s performance, it is 
unlikely that either blame (or credit) can be attached to the labour market 
data that go into its manufacture. 
 
Making a good economic case for the conducting of the additional 
surveys looks as though it would be difficult to do. My reading of the 
literature, presented in the brief survey conducted above, suggests that the 
game is not worth the candle. Let us, however, not abandon the quarterly 
surveys before looking at another of the justifications offered for the 
conducting of additional surveys, namely, the claim that they could make 
a significant contribution to composite leading indicators. 
 
How much can the LFS contribute to composite indicators? 
In a world in which perceptions of the future are so important, leading 
indicators have a prophetic role to play―a good leading indicator may be 
worth its weight in gold. Accepting that that is so, let us take a look, if we 
can, at what the implications might be of having to work with bi-annual, 
rather than quarterly labour market data, when it comes to the 
construction of composite leading indicators. 
 
If we take as our inspiration, Statistics Canada, one of the leading 
producers of official statistics in the world, then following them slavishly 
would see South Africa attempting to produce (as they do) a monthly 
labour force survey. The Canadian LFS uses a rotating panel sample, the 
size of which is 53 000 households among a total population of about 33 
million (Statistics Canada 2007, p.20). Each household stays in the panel 
for six months. It looks as though two indicators from their LFS make 
their way into the Composite Leading Indicator (CI), constructed from 
ten indicators, four of which originate outside of Statistics Canada (a 
housing index, stock price index, M1, and the US Conference Board 
Leading Indicator). The components drawn from the LFS are 
‘employment in personal and business services, the average workweek in 
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manufacturing from the labour force survey’. A description of the way 
the CI is constructed may be found on the Statistics Canada website;25 for 
our purposes here, the important point is that the ‘… composite index is 
the simple, unweighted average of the standardised components.’ That 
means that the significance of any error in the estimate of a particular 
indicator, is only one-tenth of what it is for the indicator itself. 
 
Because Statistics Canada captures the requisite information every month, 
it should be possible to estimate the effects of reducing the periodicity of 
the survey (assuming the reliability of the surveys does not change). The 
results of a (rough and ready) attempt to do so for average actual hours 
worked per week in manufacturing are presented in Table 1 below. The 
top panel of the table contains the data available from Statistics Canada. It 
is not adjusted for seasonal variation, so presumably will overstate the 
swings in the length of the workweek. 
 
Table 1 Actual average hours worked per week in manufacturing in Canada 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
January 38.7 38.7 38.5 38.6 38.2 38.3 38.7
February 38.4 38.8 38.2 38.3 38.3 38.0 38.3
March 38.7 38.1 38.1 37.5 38.0 37.7 37.8
April 39.1 36.5 38.7 33.1 36.4 38.9 33.9
May 38.6 38.4 38.6 38.0 38.9 37.9 38.4
June 38.7 38.5 38.7 38.0 38.4 38.4 38.7
July 34.7 32.2 32.1 32.7 34.3 34.0 35.4
August 36.6 35.9 35.8 34.0 36.1 36.1 36.2
September 38.9 38.5 38.6 38.8 38.7 38.4 38.6
October 36.6 33.4 33.2 33.3 33.0 33.4 32.8
November 38.8 38.6 37.4 37.4 36.9 37.2 38.2
December 39.2 38.7 39.0 38.5 38.9 39.1 38.5
        
Mean excl July 38.4 37.6 37.7 36.9 37.4 37.6 37.3
Mean Mar & Sept 38.8 38.3 38.4 38.2 38.4 38.1 38.2
% Difference 1.1 1.7 1.7 3.5 2.4 1.2 2.5
    
Excl July & Oct 38.6 38.1 38.2 37.2 37.9 38.0 37.7
Mean Mar & Sept 38.8 38.3 38.4 38.2 38.4 38.1 38.2
% Difference 0.6 0.6 0.5 2.5 1.2 0.1 1.2
Source: Statistics Canada, Table 282-0021 - Labour force survey estimates (LFS), by actual hours 
worked, class of worker, North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) and sex, 
unadjusted for seasonality, monthly 
 
The month of July, as the briefest glance at the data will confirm, differs 
significantly from the others, with the probable explanation being that it 
is vacation month for many workers.26 Estimates of mean actual hours 
worked excluding the month of July, as well as the mean for the months 
of March and September, and the percentage difference between them, 
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are given in the second panel of the table. A similar set of figures are 
given in the third panel of the table for the ten months that exclude 
October as well. 
 
Looking first at the 11-month figures, it may be seen that the worst error 
(the largest difference) occurs in 2003. Scanning the results for each 
month in that year, April soon stands out as a possible candidate for 
investigation (as it is in 2004 and 2006). The hypothesis that suggests 
itself is that the reference week included all or part of the (non-fixed) 
Easter vacation. This turns out to be only part of the explanation 
(Galarneau et al, 2005, p.9), but that is not our concern here. The main 
point is that even under the worst conditions, the observations for March 
and September would not affect the Composite Leading Indicator (CI) by 
as much as half of one percent. Removing October (vacations again?), 
makes the two-observation approach look even better. The mean error for 
the seven years for which data are presented is under one percent, or less 
than one-tenth of one percent of the CI. An error of this magnitude, it is 
submitted, is probably smaller than the noise in the other components of 
the CI. 
 
It may well be that hours worked in manufacturing is a sensitive leading 
indicator. By the time its contribution to the CI has been diluted to one-
tenth of the (nominal) significance it has when viewed in isolation, the 
justification for its collection on a quarterly basis in a country like South 
Africa looks more than a little slender. 
 
The monthly data have been used in Canada to analyse the apparently 
paradoxical coincidence of falling average hours coinciding with rising 
employment (Galarneau et al, 2005). Among the suggested causal factors 
to which the authors point are: 
 
‘… population aging, shifts in industrial structure, the business cycle, 
natural disasters, legislative changes, or simply personal preference.’ 
They note as well that: ‘Others originate from the survey’s conceptual 
frame-work, which should be re-examined periodically to see that it is 
still measuring what it is supposed to.’ (2005, p.5) 
 
While legislative changes like alterations to the social security 
frameworks that determine, say, working conditions, and the incentive 
structures that help to determine personal preferences may be informed 
by analysis conducted on LFS data, it is not obvious that quarterly, rather 
than bi-annual (or indeed, even annual) surveys are required. 
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What labour market information goes into South African composite 
indicators? 
Ten years after they were last revised, South Africa’s composite leading 
and coincident indicators, constructed by the Reserve Bank, were given a 
comprehensive overhaul in 2004 (Venter and Pretorius, 2004). No labour 
market result enters directly into the new leading indicator. One set of 
employment figures, those for manufacturing, enter indirectly into the 
indicator as the denominator of the sectoral labour productivity estimates. 
Prior to 2005, employment totals would presumably have been drawn 
from the Surveys of Employment and Earnings (SEE), a quarterly survey 
of businesses. Discontinued in June of that year, they were replaced by 
the Quarterly Employment Statistics survey (QES), with a sample of 
about 22 000 business enterprises. The pre-2004 composite leading 
indicator used to include estimates of the ratio of output prices to unit 
labour costs in manufacturing. On the labour side, these compound 
indicators use wage and employment data. Their place appears to have 
been taken by the simpler productivity estimates. 
 
Another contribution to the pre-2004 leading indicator was data on 
‘Overtime hours as percentage of ordinary hours worked in 
manufacturing’.27 The series lost is place in the indicator because of ‘non-
comparability of the series over time’. It has been replaced by ‘… an 
opinion survey of the average hours worked per factory worker in the 
manufacturing sector’. The surveys are conducted by the Bureau for 
Economic Research in the University of Stellenbosch (Venter and 
Pretorius, 2004, p.69). 
 
The composite coincident business cycle indicator used to have in it, 
estimates of employment in manufacturing, mining and construction (the 
latter, a singularly difficult sector to measure). The revised indicator now 
uses estimates of total formal non-agricultural employment. Presumably, 
these originate in the QES, although the LFS also supplies estimates of 
this variable. Let us spend a few moments looking at the differences 
between the figures generated by household surveys, as opposed to those 
that emerge from surveys of business enterprises. The discrepancies 
found between the two surveys in South Africa are not unique―to 
demonstrate this, reference is made to similar problems in the UK and 
US. 
 
How good are the surveys anyway? 
As we have seen above, both Quarterly Employment Statistics (QES) and 
LFS numbers enter the Reserve Bank’s core model, while some numbers 
from the QES make their way into both the composite leading and 
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coincident business cycle indicators. Apart from the fact that the QES 
does not attempt to measure the size of the informal economy, there are 
major differences between the estimated numbers of formal economy 
workers in the LFS and QES. The use, by commentators in the financial 
press of the most recent QES numbers to suggest that manufacturing 
employment was declining when LFS estimates show it to be rising has 
been referred to above (see Footnote 12). This raises interesting questions 
about which of the employment estimates is held in greater esteem by 
financial analysts. The rationale for the introduction of quarterly LFSs is 
user demand. The incident related above shows what at least some users 
do when confronted with conflicting statistics―in the case considered 
here, a choice appears to have been made to suit the argument being 
advanced: obviously, not a happy state of affairs. 
 
Statistics South Africa offers a battery of explanations for the differences 
between the QES and LFS in each issue of the latter. The explanations, 
although important, are not at issue here―what is of interest are the 
answers to two sets of questions. The first of these is concerned to 
discover whether or not the differences within and between sectors are 
consistent, and if not, whether the respective estimates show any sign of 
convergence. The second set of questions relate to the differences, if any, 
between year-on-year changes reported by the two surveys. The first of 
these is illustrated below in Table 2, which shows the differences, first in 
percentage terms, then in thousands, for the sectoral and total figures 
obtained respectively from the two surveys. Figures to illustrate the 
second are given in Table 3. 
 
Although the series have not been running long enough to permit 
definitive answers to the questions posed, some interesting, and possibly 
significant patterns, are beginning to emerge. So far, the LFS total has 
always been larger than the QES total―for convenience, the differences 
in Table 2 are expressed as LFS figure minus QES figure, and the 
percentages as this result, divided by the LFS number. Although there is 
considerable dispersion around mean error size, there is at least some 
consistency to the pattern of differences. The largest differences in 
percentage terms occur in electricity (also called utilities in some 
releases). Since the sector is tiny, this is not terribly important. In other 
sectors, however, some of the differences may be statistically significant, 
and hence, may matter, even when they are relatively small in percentage 
terms. Manufacturing, trade, finance and community services are all 
large. Even construction, employing about half-a-million workers is not 
inconsiderable. Variations in the reported differences between the two 
sets of employment estimates in these sectors, and in the estimates for 
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total employment, may be too large to permit access to the usual claim 
that while absolute numbers may not be correct, trends are being 
accurately detected.28 
 
Table 2 Differences between LFS and QES employment estimates 
 
March 
2005 
Sept 
2005 
March 
2006 
Sept 
2006 
March 
2007 
Sept 
2007 
Percentage differences 
Mining -9.4 -8.6 -12.6 -17.0 -7.1 -12.5
Manufacturing 14.1 17.1 21.1 19.1 11.6 15.8
Electricity 63.6 54.1 54.0 62.4 41.3 49.1
Construction 19.6 23.6 16.6 22.9 26.0 30.2
Trade 7.4 22.6 28.4 28.4 13.9 12.3
Transport 24.8 27.1 26.3 31.8 17.6 25.3
Finance (incl business services) -52.6 -22.8 -38.3 -31.6 -43.8 -47.8
Community services (excl domestic) 9.0 6.7 7.4 11.3 1.0 8.9
Total (excluding agriculture, private 
households, other and unspecified) 3.1 9.9 9.9 11.8 2.0 
 
4.7
       
 
March 
2005 
Sept 
2005 
March 
2006 
Sept 
2006 
March 
2007 
 
Actual differences (1000s) 
Mining -39 -35 -50 -67 -32 
Manufacturing 193 247 319 284 173 
Electricity 77 53 54 73 38 
Construction 93 137 91 133 165 
Trade 108 408 553 563 276 
Transport 103 124 109 149 77 
Finance (incl business services) -491 -277 -431 -386 -554 
Community services (excl domestic) 176 132 147 237 21 
Total (excluding agriculture, private 
households, other and unspecified) 221 787 791 986 164 
Sources: LFSs for the relevant months. The figures on which these comparisons are based 
(presented as a special table in each LFS) are adjusted by Statistics South Africa to make them 
comparable. 
Note: Differences between the LFS and QES are described in some detail in the LFSs. See, for 
example, Statistical Release P0210, 27 March 2008, p.xv (the September 2007 LFS). That 
points out that the LFSs include employment in the formal and informal economy, whereas the 
QES counts only the former. 
 
Table 3 discloses an altogether more alarming set of differences. If we 
assume that differences between sectoral estimates are not statistically 
significant (although they may well be, trade seems to fare particularly 
badly), the differences between the totals (even if they are not statistically 
significant either) should certainly stop us in our tracks. The importance 
of these figures lies not so much, one imagines, in their statistical 
significance, as in the interpretations made of them by those who deploy 
them―one seldom, if ever, sees an employment or unemployment 
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estimate in the financial press complete with upper and lower confidence 
interval limits―the estimate is the thing. In that spirit, we may ask what 
should be made of the apparently different economic performances 
registered by the LFSs and QESs. The March 2005 to March 2006 
increase in formal economy employment detected by the relevant LFSs 
was 870 000―the QESs say it was 300 000. For the period March 2006 
to March 2007, fortunes change. This time, the QESs report an increase 
of over a million in the employment total, while the LFSs find less than 
400 000. The September to September figures behave equally strangely. 
For the earlier year, employment growth reported by the LFSs is slightly 
larger, while for the second, QES growth of almost one million is larger 
than the LFS total by almost the same amount as it was in the March to 
March figures. 
 
Table 3 Year-on-year changes in employment, LFS and QES (1000s) 
 Mar 2005-Mar 2006 Mar 2006-Mar 2007 
 LFS QES LFS QES 
Mining -18 -7 56 38
Manufacturing 142 16 -17 129
Electricity -21 2 -8 8
Construction 74 76 87 13
Trade 481 36 36 313
Transport -1 -7 23 55
Finance (incl business services) 192 132 139 262
Community services (excluding domestic) 22 51 61 187
Total (excluding agriculture, private households, 
other and unspecified) 870 300 379 1006
     
 Sep 2005-Sep 2006 Sep 2006-Sep 2007 
 LFS QES LFS QES 
Mining -14 18 54 43
Manufacturing 42 5 81 118
Electricity 19 -1 -9 11
Construction 2 6 99 26
Trade 177 22 3 322
Transport 12 -13 10 38
Finance (incl business services) 3 112 32 245
Community services (excluding domestic) 136 31 145 183
Total (excluding agriculture, private households, 
other and unspecified) 380 181 414 985
Source: LFSs for the relevant months. 
 
It is not obvious that the problems which these results pose for those bent 
on using labour market figures, either on their own, or as inputs in 
composite indicators, are to be solved. Except for the hoped-for 
improvement in the quality of the numbers gathered, the decision to 
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conduct the LFS on a quarterly basis does not, in and of itself, offer much 
hope. Those improvements, as will be seen below, can, in any event, be 
obtained by a different route. So serious is this problem that it ought to be 
the subject of a full-scale inquiry. Let us leave it for the moment, to seek 
reassurance in the occurrence of similar, problems of the same type 
elsewhere (albeit of lesser magnitude). 
 
In the US, the surveys that correspond to Statistics South Africa’s LFS 
and QES are respectively, the Current Population Survey (CPS) ―a 
household survey,29 conducted by the Bureau of Census for Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (BLS), and the Current Employment Statistics (CES)―a 
survey of business enterprises, conducted by state employment security 
agencies in co-operation with the BLS. In May 2005, the BLS asked the 
Federal Economic Statistics Advisory Committee (FESAC) to investigate 
discrepancies between the employment trends reported variously by the 
CPS and the CES (FESAC, 2005). These were large enough to cause 
some consternation among users.30 It is not the intention to look in any 
detail at the discrepancies, suffice it to say that the investigation serves as 
a model for a similar enterprise in South Africa. Statistics South Africa, 
as noted above, draws attention to the causes of the discrepancies. It is 
perhaps heartening to note that several of the problems that bedevil 
statistics gathering in South Africa, also plague the much-more well-
endowed statistics agencies in the US. Among these are problems with 
population estimates, especially over immigration data; problems with 
informal and self-employment, the inherent noisiness of the CPS. 
 
In the UK, the two surveys that yield employment figures are 
respectively, a monthly LFS and a survey known as Workforce Jobs 
(WFJ), a survey of businesses.31 As in the US, problems with the results 
generated by the surveys have led to a review.32 In the UK:  
 
‘[The] review was set up to investigate the large revision to the 
business surveys estimate of jobs, known as Workforce Jobs (WFJ), 
that arose as a result of benchmarking the Short Term Employment 
Surveys (STES) results on the 2005 Annual Business Inquiry (ABI1). 
It also examined the difference in the annual growth in jobs as 
measured by the Labour Force Survey (LFS) and WFJ.’ (WFJ Review, 
2007, p.1). 
 
Once more, the details do not concern us―it is comforting, however, to 
note again that the Office for National Statistics (ONS) in the UK, with 
its substantial resources, also has difficulties with inter alia, migrants 
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(temporary foreign workers); the self-employed; mis-reporting, and non-
response (WFJ Review, 2007, p.2).33 
 
An ONS article (Walling, 2006) comparing the LFS and WFJ discloses 
that the difference between them in June 2006 was 1.036 million, or 3.3 
percent of WFJ employment estimate for that month. Once adjustments 
have been made for survey coverage and response issues in the two 
surveys, the difference falls to 152 000, or 0.5 percent of employment, 
hardly a figure about which to lose sleep. Response issues, however, 
involve some fairly hefty corrections: double-counting due to over-
reporting of self-employment in the WFK – 340 000; LFS non-response 
bias – 230 000; LFS proxy response error (main jobs) – 150 000; LFS 
proxy response (second jobs) – 100 000; ABI/STES response errors – 
100 000 (Table 1, p.374). These errors are present in the UK 
surveys―they are also present in the South African surveys. Among 
them, only non-response is discussed in the LFS news releases. 
 
The lesson to be drawn from this analysis is that if folk wish to use labour 
market indicators either alone or in combination with other indicators, in 
the hope of uncovering credible stories about the economy, then a much 
more rigorous process than a user consultation (with no apparent trace in 
the form of supporting documents made publicly available), and 
discussion with overseas experts, is required. It is recommended that 
between them, the Statistics Council and Statistics South Africa draw up 
the terms of reference for an urgent inquiry into this matter. 
 
In the meanwhile, there are certain other steps that may be taken to bring 
about improvements in the quality of labour market information. Two of 
these are discussed below. 
 
Suggested steps: (i) Measure labour demand more accurately 
Unlike their South Africa counterparts, the CPS and CES in the US take 
place each month. Commenting on the suite of surveys, Clark and Hyson 
(2000, p.1), observe that: 
 
‘When combined with other economic indicators, the unemployment 
rate serves as a reasonable measure of labor market activity, general 
economic conditions, and labor supply. A parallel measure of labor 
demand is required to allow thorough analysis of the U.S. labor market 
and to show how changes in labor supply and demand affect the 
overall economy.’ (Emphasis added)34 
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To fill this gap in the labour market information available to analysts, the 
BLS started developing a survey that could measure excess demand for 
labour. Although South Africa is not blessed with the good fortune of 
having an aggregate excess demand for labour, measuring excess demand 
where it exists, as well as demand in those areas for which there is 
surplus supply, would seem like a thoroughly worthy undertaking. The 
survey instituted in the US is called the Job Openings and Labor 
Turnover Survey (JOLTS). As its name implies, it does more than merely 
ask a panel of employers whether or not they had difficulty obtaining the 
supplies of labour they required―information is collected on job 
openings, hires and total separations. The latter are: 
 
‘… the sum of three components: quits (or voluntary separations); 
layoffs and discharges (involuntary separations); and other separations 
resulting from retirements, deaths, and disability.’ (Clark, 2004, p.14) 
 
The first results were published in 2002, and a couple of years later, the 
BLS published an article (Clark, 2004) discussing the survey’s early 
results. It is not the intention here to delve into the results in any detail, 
nor indeed to engage with the discussion in the earlier paper (Clark and 
Hyson, 2000) of the potential uses of the survey (JOLTS) for 
policymakers and academics. One aspect of the survey worth 
commenting on is that when a sufficient number of observations has been 
collected, the results can be tested against the Beveridge curve 
hypothesis, namely that there is an inverse (concave) relationship 
between the vacancy rate and the unemployment rate. Cyclical 
movements should give rise to movements along the curve, while 
structural changes, say in labour market matching, should cause the curve 
to move closer to, or further from, the origin. The South African situation 
is complicated by the greater duality of its labour markets, but that only 
serves to make the survey potentially more interesting. 
 
Clark notes that the JOLTS does not differentiate: 
 
‘… between full- or part-time openings, and neither includes 
occupational information or a measure of “good” jobs versus “bad” 
jobs or for low-wage versus high-wage positions. As the JOLTS 
program expands, questions related to these issues may be added to the 
survey.’ (2004, p.18) 
 
Statistics South Africa’s Quarterly Employment Survey (QES), the 
product of careful deliberation about how to extract the optimum amount 
of information (carefully balancing the need for data against respondent 
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burden), includes information on hires (Question 1.2: New 
Appointments), and separations (Question 1.3: Resignations, transfers, 
retrenchments and dismissals).35 Missing from the survey are questions 
on job openings,36 and a breakdown of the causes of separation.37 The 
QES is a sample survey that covers about 22 000 enterprises (as noted 
above), whereas the JOLTS is a relatively small (16 000 establishments) 
rotating panel survey, with establishments spending about 18 months 
participating in the survey (recall here that the JOLTS is a monthly 
survey). 
 
It is suggested that Statistics South Africa give consideration to instituting 
something like the JOLTS. What use there may be for the information 
presently gathered in the QES on hires and separations is not obvious―it 
would seem that an understanding of labour market dynamics demands 
that at least the JOLTS questions be asked. In addition, however, the 
‘good jobs, bad jobs’; ‘high-skilled, low-skilled’ ‘duality’38 of the South 
African labour markets, which nettle, as of 2004, the BLS had not 
grasped, cannot be ignored. Acute shortages of skilled labour coinciding 
with unemployment are by no means unique to South Africa. The extent 
of that unemployment, does, however, set it somewhat apart. The nature 
of the unemployment, dubbed ‘structural’, for want of a better name, is 
not very well understood. Its mass character demands that every effort 
possible be made to do so. 
 
Suggested steps: (ii) Pooling LFS and GHS data 
There is a way around some of the problems discussed above which 
appears to have much to recommend it, namely, aligning the LFSs and 
GHSs so that for certain critical questions, the data could be pooled. If the 
survey cycle is changed from the present March LFS, July GHS and 
September LFS, to a February, July and October cycle, then a smaller 
number of survey enumerators could be employed on a full-time basis, 
without any sacrifice in survey quality. As matters presently stand, it 
appears that the proposed work plan for the LFS will leave no space for 
the LFS enumerators to carry out the GHS as well. If, however, the 
February, July and October cycle were adopted, the same team could do 
both surveys, thus effecting even more improvements in survey quality, 
but at a very substantial savings in cost, savings that would be all the 
larger, because there would be no need to employ a special team to 
conduct a single survey (the GHS). Such a cycle, with its slightly more 
relaxed working pace, should allow time for ‘bolt-ons’ or ‘piggyback’ 
studies on both surveys, and in addition, could even allow for the 
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possibility of training interviewers in the far more demanding task of 
conducting qualitative surveys. 
 
Aligning the income and expenditure data collected by the LFS and GHS, 
and improving the quality of both (reducing lead times as well, by the 
use, where possible, of direct electronic data capture) raises the 
possibility, again as I have suggested elsewhere (Meth, 2006b), of using 
both the GHSs and LFSs to measure poverty and inequality. Without 
having to pilot anything, future surveys could be made to yield numbers 
suitable for generating such estimates. Information from these two 
surveys could be used to check the results of the proposed poverty 
survey, as well as the 2006 Income and Expenditure Survey (IES) for 
consistency. The migrant module in the September 2004 LFS, containing 
15 questions (which worked quite well, except for the migrant number 
identifier), could be bolted onto the 2005 GHS questionnaire, which 
could easily lose the ‘green’ questions (4.50 to 4.62 in the 2005 GHS). 
Other questions could possibly be dropped as well. It maybe that the 
income question can be tightened up along the lines I have suggested 
previously (Meth, 2006b), with more rigorous consistency checking at 
interview time to reduce implausible zeroes. If the reference period for 
work can be extended to the past 30 days instead of the seven days 
currently used, (as is done for discovering whether or not a person has 
taken any active steps to find work or start a business), it may be that 
significant increases in the numbers working, albeit for very small 
amounts of money, may be found. 
 
PART II: CHANGES IN EMPLOYMENT AND 
UNEMPLOYMENT 
 
Table 4 reproduces the official employment estimates for the period 
2000-2007. Year-on-year figures (March to March, and September to 
September) for each of three employment series.39 The first of them is a 
measure of total employment that includes estimates for formal 
agriculture, but which excludes the estimates of informal agricultural 
employment. The second set gives the formal sector employment figures, 
excluding agricultural employment. The last set of figures is that for 
informal agricultural employment. Measuring the growth in small-scale 
farming, as part of the programme of land reform, is very important. So 
too, is measurement of subsistence production. The LFS does not appear, 
however, to be capable of doing either task very well. As may be seen, 
apart from a hint of seasonality, the results in Table 4, which show no 
particular trend, yield an implausibly small total of people working on the 
land among a genuinely rural population that probably exceeds ten 
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million. Noise in the first series may, therefore, be reduced by removing 
the informal agricultural workers. 
 
Some effort was devoted in the introductory section of the present paper 
to claims by the President, and the Minister of Finance of 500 000 jobs a 
year being created. It was pointed out that when the 2007 State of Nation 
address was delivered (9th February 2007), the latest available 
employment figures were for March 2006 (Statistical release P.0210, 26th 
September 2006). If by ‘the past three years’ the President was referring 
to the period March 2003 to March 2006, the annual changes may be seen 
to have been estimated at 200 000, 340 000 and 350 000. The average of 
these three figures is a little less than 300 000. If the President had in 
mind the period September 2002 to September 2005, then the relevant 
numbers would have been 310 00, 160 000 and a whopping 750 000 for 
September 2004 to September 2005, a figure that can lend an interesting 
twist to stories about employment creation.40 It helps to get the average 
up to 400 000 a year. Whatever one does with the series in Table 4, if one 
concedes that informal agricultural employment figures do not sit 
comfortably in the employment estimates,41 then one can extract from 
them neither the President’s ‘million and a half’, nor the Minister of 
Finance’s ‘500 000 jobs a year’, from the figures available at the time the 
claims cited above were made. 
 
It was meet and just, as noted above, for the President to have celebrated 
the creation of 300 000 formal sector jobs in the period March 2005 to 
March 2006. The March 2007 LFS results, released at the end of 
September 2007, confirmed the trend of solid if unspectacular growth in 
the formal economy. Employment stood at 8 059 000 in March 2006. By 
March 2007, this had risen to 8 423 000, a jump of 364 000, with the bulk 
of the new jobs located in Construction (87 000) and Finance (139 000). 
The September 2005 to September 2006 results provided even greater 
cause for satisfaction than the March figures―with 400 000 jobs being 
created in the formal sector over the period, a performance that was to be 
repeated in the following year. Between September 2006 and the same 
month in 2007, manufacturing grew by 81 000, construction by 99 000 
and community, social and personal services by 145 000. 
 
While formal economy employment performance may be some cause for 
celebration, it is far from obvious how much significance one ought to 
attach to total employment estimates. Informal agricultural employment 
is not the only source of noise in the employment estimates. A further 
glance at the figures for 2001 in Table 4, shows that the March figure (the 
LFS was actually conducted in February in that year) exceeded the 
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September figure by more than 700 000. A decline of 370 000 in total 
employment between September 2000 and September 2001 is plausible, a 
fall of 780 000 between March (February) 2001 and March 2002 is 
probably not. 
 
Table 4 Employment in South Africa, 2000-2007 (1000s) 
September estimates 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Total excluding 
informal agriculture 11 170 10 800 10 750 11 060 11 220 11 970 12 270
 
12 900
Change from previous 
September - -370 -50  310  160  750  300
 
630
Formal economy 
excluding agriculture 7 091 7 027 7 181 7 373 7 692 7 987 8 384
 
8 785
Change from previous 
September  -64 154 192 319 295 397
 
401
    
March estimates 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Total excluding 
informal agriculture - 11 540 10 760 10 860 11 060 11 400 11 750
 
12 190
Change from previous 
March - - -780  100  200  340  350
 
440
Formal economy 
excluding agriculture - 6 807 7 097 7 228 7 483 7 749 8 059
 
8 423
Change from previous 
March - - 290 131 255 266 310
 
364
    
Employment in 
informal agriculture 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 
2007 
September 1080 390 560 370 430 340 480 350
March - 750 870 450 350 520 710 460
Source: Labour Force Surveys (P0210) for the relevant periods 
 
The interaction between formal and informal economy estimates above 
suggests that the two need to be separated. Total employment growth 
over the year September 2004 to September 2005 is reportedly 750 000, 
of which 295 000 jobs were in the formal economy. The following year, 
informal economy performance pulls overall performance down―formal 
employment increases by almost 400 000, while total employment rises 
by only 300 000. 
 
In February 2001, in addition to the February LFS, Statistics South Africa 
conducted a ‘follow-on’ survey, the Survey of Employers and Self-
Employed 2001 (SESE), in which: 
 
‘… more probing questions about self-employment and small 
businesses were asked …’ 
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This, they note: 
 
‘… may have led to a larger number of respondents than usual 
classifying themselves as employed’ (SR P0210, 26 March 2002, p.v). 
 
The problems caused by the outlier generated by the follow-on survey 
have never been satisfactorily resolved―indeed, given the frequent 
expressions of surprise at the relatively small reported size of the informal 
economy in South Africa, it has been suggested that the February 2001 
informal economy employment estimate is ‘correct’, while all other 
estimates are outliers.42 
 
It were an excellent idea if Statistics South Africa were to repeat the 
follow-on survey (SESE) it carried out after the February 2001 LFS. 
Without knowing precisely what the plans are for the quarterly LFSs, it is 
a little difficult to guess how good the surveys will be at picking up 
informal economy activity. If they are ‘simply more of the same’, carried 
out in the hope that (large-scale?) seasonal changes will be detected by 
the more frequent surveys, then the possibility of disappointment should 
be faced. Better than waiting for such an outcome, it is suggested, would 
be an attempt to settle the question posed so long ago by the follow-on 
survey. 
 
Gauging the significance of the employment figures 
Job creation figures such as those set out in Table 4 above, cited in 
isolation from other information required to understand development, do 
not contribute much to an understanding of the workings of the economy. 
Several analytical steps need to be taken to make them meaningful. One 
of them is to offset employment creation estimates against estimates of 
increases in the size of the labour force and the working age population. 
There is no necessary correspondence between the latter two, the one 
(participation rates) being mainly the outcome of perceived economic 
conditions, the other of demographic forces (births, deaths), which 
although not immune to economic forces, operate at several removes 
from them.43 How participation rates are determined is difficult to say 
with precision. It has been observed, for example, that official rates of 
unemployment can rise with improving economic conditions, as formerly 
discouraged workers begin actively seeking work. Increasing 
employment may thus be consistent with rising participation rates44 and 
rising unemployment rates and numbers (this happened between 
September 2004 and September 2005). It is also possible, however, for 
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rising participation rates to coincide with rising employment and falling 
unemployment (falling in either/or absolute and relative terms). 
 
Interpretation of the published figures is what is at issue above. There are, 
however, other problems to be confronted when dealing with South 
Africa’s employment and unemployment numbers. One of them concerns 
the question of the size of the working age population. Some confusion 
about its magnitude has arisen (at least in the minds of statistics users), 
following the discovery by Statistics South Africa (SSA) that population 
growth rates had not fallen as quickly as had been believed.45 The 
combination of this and the erratic behaviour of the (official) participation 
rate, makes it difficult to peer into the future. Having peaked at an 
implausible 59.4 percent in 2001 (the year of the Survey of Employers 
and Self-Employed, which took place in February), the rate stood at a 
possibly less unlikely 58.3 percent in March 2002. It then fell to its 
lowest value of 53.8 in September 2004, only to claw its way back to 57.1 
percent in September 2006. Since then, it has slipped a little, to 56.5 
percent in September 2007. 
 
In our earlier discussion of the number of jobs required to halve 
unemployment, it was pointed out that the estimates are sensitive to the 
assumptions made about the rate of growth of the economically active 
population (labour force). If the labour force grows at the same rate as the 
working age population, and if the working age population grows at 
roughly the rate that it did over the period 2003-2007 (about 1.27 percent 
per annum), then about 400 000 jobs a year would be required between 
2007 and 2014 to halve the September 2003 unemployment rate of 28 
percent. There would be 2.6 million unemployed, down from 4.4 million 
in September 2003. Any increase in the participation rate pushes up the 
number of jobs that have to be created, and leaves the total number of 
unemployed higher. If the rate of growth of the labour force rises to 1.8 
percent per annum, so that the participation rate climbs to 58.6 percent in 
2014, up from its September 2007 value of 56.5 percent, then 500 000 
jobs a year would needed to halve the official unemployment rate, leaving 
2.7 million unemployed in 2014. 
 
As far as the expanded unemployment rate is concerned (which the 
authorities do not deign to publish, on the grounds that doing so causes 
confusion), if the roughly stationary behaviour of the expanded 
participation rate observed over the period 2003-2007 were to continue to 
2014, then about 650 000 jobs a year would be required to bring the 
September 2003 unemployment rate of 41.8 percent, to half of that value 
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by 2014. If that were achieved, there would be 4.7 million unemployed, 
as opposed to 8.2 million in September 2003. 
 
On the basis of the figures cited above, it is clear that if the trends 
observed between 2005 and 2007 were to continue, less faith would be 
required to believe that (official) unemployment could be halved in the 
seven years between the present and the year 2014, than was the case 
when I first wrote on the topic of halving unemployment (Meth, 2006a). 
A slowdown, which looks as though it cannot be avoided, has, however, 
taken the shine off the good performance of the recent past. If this lowers 
net job creation to about 300 000 a year for a couple of years, growth in 
the remaining period (five years) will have to deliver at least 600 000 jobs 
per annum without faltering. 
 
Speculative though the calculations above undoubtedly are, they provide 
a backdrop against which to assess labour market performance. Updated 
on a regular basis, the simple calculating engine on which they are based, 
should form an integral part of the apparatus for analysing labour market 
information as it becomes available. A careful watch on the behaviour of 
the participation rate, and research into its determinants is indicated. We 
do not know enough about the dynamics of labour market transitions. It 
may well be that qualitative research is required to bolster the quantitative 
material available. Given relatively large standard errors, the tale that the 
figures have to tell may be too broad brush to offer much insight into the 
workings of the labour market. 
 
Routes out of poverty: Getting behind the aggregates 
In the discussion above, attention has been paid mainly to the aggregate 
figures. If most jobs are going to those with skills (who are unlikely to be 
found in households that are poor), aggregate figures could mask a 
worsening in the conditions of the poor. To reduce poverty, not only must 
jobs be created at a brisk rate―some substantial proportion of the jobs 
that are created must go to households that are workerless at present, or to 
those that are home to the working poor. Rather obviously, the more 
‘decent’ the jobs going to the poor, especially (but not only) in terms of 
the wage paid, the more rapid the reduction in poverty.46 The question of 
who gets such jobs as are created, is thus of paramount importance.47 It is 
common cause that those who are best placed, either by qualification, 
social location (ability to network), and/or geographical location 
(proximity to employment possibilities) are likely to be first in the queue 
for jobs. People with such characteristics are not usually to be found at 
the bottom of the income distribution. Banerjee et al (2006) offer support 
for this proposition, arguing that those most likely to find paid 
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employment will have a matric (grade 12) plus some post-matric 
qualification (p.26) and will not face excessive job-search costs (p.47). If 
true, this would rule out, more or less, the poorly-educated, especially in 
areas remote from the major metropoles. 
 
Since education (and training) are the cornerstones of long-term anti-
poverty policy in South Africa (and elsewhere), and since it is widely 
believed that education (and training) are the only sustainable routes out 
of poverty (they are necessary, but not sufficient), analysis of the efficacy 
of education as a means of gaining employment is urgently required. In 
addition, since networking is known to be crucial (Schöer and Leibbrandt, 
2006; Magruder, 2007)48 but difficult to understand, it is recommended 
that the LFSs be revised so that a proper understanding of these 
phenomena becomes possible. 
 
In principle, the question of who benefits from job creation should be 
capable of being answered by the LFSs―they are, after all, quasi-panel 
studies (20 percent of the sample is ‘rotated’ out of the panel at each 
round). The labour market paper by Banerjee et al (2006), one of a 
number written by members of the ‘Harvard panel’ convened to study 
constraints and opportunities confronting the state’s AsgiSA (Accelerated 
and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa), is among the very few 
based on longitudinal analysis on the LFS data. Its conclusions are 
pessimistic, although this may be due to the fact that the authors were 
apparently constrained to looking at changes between wave 6 (September 
2002 ) and wave 7 (March 2003), a period when total employment rose 
by a trivial 8000 (from 11.296 million to 11.304 million).49 This, in turn, 
is because the matched data for this period were the latest that were 
available at the time from Statistics South Africa, the institution 
responsible for (and the only institution capable of) matching respondents 
from different waves of the survey.50 
 
For purposes of understanding the poverty-reducing impact of growth via 
job creation, it would be more interesting to see what happens when 
employment actually grows by relatively large numbers, as it appears to 
have done between September 2004 and September 2005. As a matter of 
urgency, it is recommended that up-to-date matched data sets be made 
available as soon as possible after the release of the key LFS in any 
year.51 
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Occupation 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Increase 
2002 to 
2007 
Increase 
2004 to 
2007 
Legislators, senior officials & managers  633  708  708  834  798  852  906 198 72
Professionals  463  477  554  534  533  603  590 113 56
Technical & associated professionals  1 185  1 207  1 131  1 132  1 129  1 176  1 179 -28 47
Plant & machine operators & 
assemblers  1 168  1 160  1 198  1 158  1 172  1 095  1 164 4 6
Craft & related trades workers  1 559  1 417  1 405  1 417  1 642  1 708  1 770 353 353
Clerks  1 071  1 108  1 100  1 172  1 198  1 207  1 266 158 94
Plant & machine operators & 
assemblers  1 168  1 160  1 198  1 158  1 172  1 095  1 164 4 6
Service, shop & market sales workers  1 670  1 325  1 291  1 347  1 460  1 557  1 631 306 284
Elementary occupations  2 679  2 241  2 561  2 624  2 670  2 738  2 771 530 147
Domestic workers  843  877  884  847  850  850  936 59 89
Unspecified/Other  52  43  44  15  24  20  17 -26 2
Total, excluding agricultural workers  11 323  10 563  10 876  11 080  11 476  11 806  12 230 1 667 1 150
          
          
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers  951  1 055  428  311  432  644  417 -638 106
Total  12 275  11 617  11 304  11 392  11 907  12 451  12 648 1 031 1 256
Source: P0210, 26 September 2007, p.viii. 
Note: The category Unspecified/Other has been omitted. The numbers involved are small (52 000 at most). Employment numbers are for 
workers in both the formal and informal economies. 
 
Table 5 Employment by occupation, March 2001-March 2007 (1000s) 
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For a country in rapid transition, and in which the rate of job creation has 
speeded up in recent times, the critical task of matching does not enjoy 
the priority it should. There is an urgent need to discover who it is that is 
becoming employed (or to use development-speak, we need to know 
whether or not growth is ‘pro-poor’). In the absence of up-to-date 
longitudinal analysis, one way of looking at this question is to examine 
the distribution of jobs by occupation, proceeding on the assumption that 
skilled jobs, in general, are not filled by the poor, or the untrained. The 
pattern that emerges over the period 2001-2007 is shown below in Table 
5. 
 
The troublesome February 2001 figures have been left in the table. For 
the purposes of the discussion of whether or not jobs are going to the 
poor, one way around the ‘outlier’ problem caused by the February 2001 
figures, is to assume that the bias in the collection of informal economy 
data is constant. Accordingly, changes in employment by occupation are 
estimated for two periods in Table 5―those that took place between 
March 2002 and March 2007, and those between March 2004 and March 
2007. Broadly speaking, jobs in the economy decrease in skill content as 
one makes one’s way down the table. The occupations in the table have 
been re-arranged from the order in which they appear in the LFS 
statistical release to accord with the (popular) perception of the time 
necessary to acquire the relevant skills. Thus craft and related workers, 
many of whom serve an apprenticeship or pupillage which may last for a 
few years, should rank above clerks. There is an inescapably arbitrary 
element to this procedure, but not so much so as to invalidate the 
exercise. At a guess, Plant and machine operators and assemblers would 
probably be ranked ahead of Service, shop and market sales workers.52 
Mean skill levels (if one can conceive of such a notion) are probably 
similar. 
 
If they could obtain employment at all, many of the would-be workers 
without prior work experience, and consequently with no workplace 
skills,53 some large proportion of whom one would expect to find in poor 
households, would, it is contended, be fortunate to obtain entry-level jobs 
in Elementary occupations, or as Domestic workers (skilled work which 
is not always recognised as such). With luck (and good social networks) 
some will find work in the retail sector as sales workers, while a few will 
be absorbed into routine factory work. Adding up the work opportunities 
that might have gone to members of poor households, we see a trivial 
increase in the number of domestic workers, while the number in 
Elementary occupations rises by 530 00 for the period as a whole (2002-
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2007). If the figures are to be believed, this slows to a mere 150 000 over 
the years 2004-2007. If half of the Service, shop and sales jobs went to 
the poor, jobs flowing their way would have numbered about 30 000 or so 
per annum. A total of about 80-90 000 jobs a year for the poor is not an 
impressive performance. 
 
Networking 
Re-engineering of the LFS has meant that a series of changes have taken 
place in the survey with which it has not been easy to keep pace. For 
purposes of the discussion which follows, I shall make reference to the 
questionnaire for the September 2004 LFS. Issues of the precise wording 
and numbering of the questions, and of the way in which these have 
changed (and indeed the issue of whether or not the required questions 
have been removed from the surveys), are not important for the argument 
that follows: what matters is the design required to obtain the necessary 
information. 
 
The question in the September 2004 LFS on mode of job search was 
aimed at those who have not succeeded in obtaining work (question 3.8), 
rather than those who have (the target group was: ‘All household 
members aged 15 and above who are willing to accept jobs if offered and 
have tried to look for work in the four weeks prior the interview’). Six 
alternatives were offered, among them, one which would elicit 
information on networking. A question like 3.8 could easily be aimed at 
all who have recently become employed. Isolating them would be a 
simple matter because Question 4.5 asked when workers started with 
current employer, making it possible to catch all ‘new’ employees. If the 
survey were to be re-organised along the lines suggested here, it would be 
possible to understand job search methods without having to wait for 
matching of records, although that, of course, is still highly desirable. 
 
Networking, as noted above, appears to be extremely important, but 
poorly understood. Instead of restricting itself to the revisions suggested 
above, Statistics South Africa might want to consider making job search 
the subject a of an add-on module to the LFS. If this were done, it would 
be possible to probe more deeply into areas such as networking, where 
density and geographical location seem to be important determinants of 
efficacy. 
 
Education 
Administrative records on educational attainment are quite good. 
Although fairly long historical series based on these data are available, 
they obviously cannot provide information on the huge range of variables 
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 dealt with in the household surveys. Information on education must, 
therefore, continue to be collected in the latter. Since the connection 
between labour market performance and education, although complex, is 
known to be crucial, the Labour Force Surveys are an obvious vehicle for 
collecting information on education. That being so, some thought ought 
to be given to ways in which the usefulness of the education data can be 
improved. There is a possibility that what long ago used to be called the 
matriculation exemption certificate (a pass in grade 12 which made it 
unnecessary to write a university entrance examination), and which is 
now apparently called a university endorsement, may act as a signalling 
device to potential employers. The education module could be used to 
probe into issues around the grade 12 results. Performance differs 
strikingly along what would conventionally be described as race lines, but 
what are, in addition, and more importantly, socio-economic status (SES) 
lines.54 Understanding the labour market performance of the different 
population groups, sorted along SES lines rather than merely along race 
lines, is of self-evident importance. The significant overlap of the two 
(race and SES) down at the bottom end of the distribution is likely to 
persist for a long while, but towards the top end, this correspondence has 
already started to weaken significantly. It would be useful to be able to tie 
grade 12 performance (plus information on performance in mathematics 
and science at the higher grade) to household conditions (especially 
income and expenditure levels), and thence to success or otherwise in the 
labour market (or success in tertiary education). As the LFSs (GHSs) 
currently stand, this is not possible―the data that would enable one to do 
so are not collected. 
 
Collecting and disseminating LFS income and expenditure data 
Mention of socio-economic status takes us back to a problem with the 
Labour Force Surveys that I have raised elsewhere, namely the removal, 
after September 2004, of the household section of the surveys, and with 
it, the collection of information on social grants and household 
expenditure (Meth, 2006b). Without comprehensive information on all 
sources of income, any understanding of labour market dynamics, the 
ostensible reason for running the LFSs in the first place, must be but 
partial. 
 
There was talk that income was also slated for removal from the LFS on 
the grounds that it was either under-reported or mis-reported to the point 
where it was thought to be misleading. There is a simple way to check 
this, namely, to compare the income figures gathered in the LFSs with 
those collected in the General Household Surveys (GHSs). Given a 
sufficient number of shared characteristics, inconsistencies should 
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become immediately apparent. In any event, the presentation in the 
September 2007 LFS of estimates of income by sector (Table 3.5, p.18) 
means that at least for the moment, income is still there. For users who 
are not able to gain access to the data provided by Statistics South Africa 
(website and/or CD ROM),55 the usefulness of the information would be 
greatly enhanced if the widths of the income categories were reduced. 
Published results are sorted into only four categories: doubling this 
number, if possible, and pushing up the level at which the open category 
begins (presently at R8001 per month plus) would not damage the 
readability of the table. It is particularly important to narrow the 
categories below R1000 per month, for that is where many of the working 
poor are to be found (about 1.2 million formal economy workers, the 
same number of informal economy workers, and almost 700 000 
domestic workers earned R1000 or less per month in September 2007). 
 
The usefulness of the employment figures would also be increased if the 
approach recommended above on earnings were applied to that part of the 
statistical release reporting monthly income by main industry (sectors of 
the economy at the single-digit SIC classification). Difficult as they are to 
estimate, the earnings of informal economy workers should also to be 
published. If, instead of the present approach (see Table 3.9 on p.24 of the 
September 2007 LFS) of assigning workers to one of only three income 
categories (R0-2500: R2501-8000, and R8001 plus), the multiplicity of 
income categories suggested above, were used, the information would be 
of much greater value to users. 
 
If, to ensure that the estimates of numbers in each category are large 
enough to be reliable (>10 000) a cut-off level of, say, 300 000 workers in 
a sector were adopted, only utilities would be excluded from the formal 
sector. In the informal sector, agriculture, construction and trade would be 
picked up. Presented in this manner, the income estimates would cover 
more than 98 percent of workers in the formal sector, and almost two-
thirds of informal economy workers. It is not necessary to include 
domestic workers among the latter, because information on earnings for 
this group of workers (1 075 000 in September 2007) is presented along 
with earnings for formal and informal economy workers. Nearly two-
thirds of all domestic workers earn less than R1000 per month (P0210, 27 
March 2008, Table 3.5, p.18). Since there is a minimum wage set in this 
sector, it would be interesting to see how many full-time workers earn 
less than the minimum. 
 
A complaint one quite frequently hears at conferences and workshops 
attended by organisations representing workers and the poor is that very 
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large numbers of people work long hours for low pay, and conversely, 
that large numbers of people are classified as ‘employed’ even though 
they may only have worked for one hour during the week. The surveys 
tend to bear out the former, but do not offer much support to the latter. It 
would help matters if a table reporting hours of work by monthly income 
were presented in the news release. Another concern expressed is that 
some significant number would work longer hours if they had the 
opportunity to do so. The survey collects this information as well, so that 
presenting tables of such persons, by income level, would present no 
difficulty at all. 
 
Examples of how this information may be presented are given below in 
Tables 6 and 7. Estimated from the data set for the September 2004 LFS, 
the figures both for the distribution of workers by income category and 
number of hours worked, and for the distribution of those who wished to 
work for longer, again by income category, are given with two sets of 
values. The first of these assumes that earned incomes are accurately 
reported in the survey. The second assumes (unrealistically) that every 
worker under-reported their income by 75 percent (i.e., to obtain their 
‘true’ incomes, reported incomes have been multiplied by 1.75). Income 
categories used also differ from those used by Statistics South Africa. 
R310 per month in 2004 was roughly equivalent to R250 per month in 
2000 prices―R250 per capita per month is the poverty line used in the 
two studies contending for the position of more reliable poverty estimate 
for 2004 (van der Berg et al, 2005; Meth, 2006b). 
 
As one would expect, the zero-error figures paint the more sombre 
picture. Also as one would expect, however, the total numbers of people 
reporting that they work a given number of hours does not vary. What 
changes is their distribution among the various income classes. A peep at 
the results suggests that of the 72 000 people working less than five hours 
per week, less than half wish to work longer hours. 
  
 
Table 6 No. of hours usually worked (including overtime) by monthly income – Sept 2004 
 Total monthly individual income by category, zero under-reporting 
Number of hours usually worked 
including overtime R1-149 
R150-
309 
R310-
399 R400-799 R800-1199 
R1200-
1799 
R1800-
2499 
R2500-
4999 
R5000-
9999 R10000+ Total 
0-<5  9 700  20 200  900  17 800  9 200  5 400  2 200  1 800  600  3 700  72 200 
5-<10  23 700  49 700  4 200  35 500  13 100  3 600  4 700  5 700  2 700  2 900  145 500 
10-<20  28 400  76 900  22 500  129 000  42 600  20 200  7 700  17 800  8 200  5 700  358 500 
20-<30  28 400  63 900  24 900  157 400  59 200  37 900  24 900  29 600  33 200  19 000  477 900 
30-<40  21 300  72 200  37 900  204 700  123 100  108 900  65 100  140 800  215 300  73 400 1 063 500 
40-<50  50 900  147 900  72 200  640 000  595 000  843 400  746 400 1 385 200 1 251 500  630 500 6 367 500 
50-<60  24 900  62 700  37 900  339 500  216 500  223 600  164 500  246 100  160 900  158 600 1 636 000 
60+  36 700  105 300  60 400  359 600  213 000  240 200  153 800  246 100  142 000  145 500 1 703 400 
Column total  222 400  599 800  261 500 1 885 600 1 272 800 1 483 400 1 169 900 2 073 600 1 815 800 1 039 800 11 828 800 
Cumulative proportion (%) 1.9 7.0 9.2 25.1 35.9 48.4 58.3 75.9 91.2 100.0  
            
 Total monthly individual income by category, allowing for 75% under-reporting 
Number of hours usually worked 
including overtime R1-149 
R150-
309 
R310-
399 R400-799 R800-1199 
R1200-
1799 
R1800-
2499 
R2500-
4999 
R5000-
9999 R10000+ Total 
0-<5  4 700  6 300  15 400  5 600  15 400  10 900  1 800  6 000  1 800  4 300  72 200 
5-<10  3 200  27 300  27 300  26 100  26 100  16 600  1 800  7 700  5 800  5 100  145 500 
10-<20  4 500  35 500  39 100  82 900  74 600  58 000  11 100  21 300  20 200  10 700  358 500 
20-<30  5 700  30 800  33 200  80 500  97 000  76 900  28 400  43 800  40 300  39 100  477 900 
30-<40  2 100  28 400  32 000  119 500  108 900  143 200  84 000  124 300  195 200  226 000 1 063 500 
40-<50  5 800  59 200  72 200  222 400  344 300  682 600  576 100 1 389 900 1 518 900 1 494 000 6 367 500 
50-<60  4 700  24 900  28 400  121 900  185 800  269 700  178 700  306 400  239 000  274 500 1 636 000 
60+  2 200  41 500  45 000  177 500  198 800  262 600  173 900  317 100  242 500  242 500 1 703 400 
Column total  32 000  253 200  293 400  838 700 1 050 400 1 520 000 1 055 200 2 219 100 2 262 900 2 298 400 11 828 800 
Cumulative proportion (%) 0.3 2.4 4.9 12.0 20.9 33.7 42.7 61.4 80.6 100.0  
Source: Estimated from data for September 2004 LFS. 
Note: As Statistics South Africa points out, ‘for values of 10 000 or lower, the sample is too small for reliable estimates’ 
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 Total monthly individual income by category, zero under-reporting 
Number of hours usually worked R1-149 
R150-
309 
R310-
399 R400-799 R800-1199 
R1200-
1799 R1800-2499 
R2500-
4999 
R5000-
9999 R10000+ Total 
0-<5  4 900  9 900  300  7 000  1 700  1 000  1 000  300  0  3 800  29 300 
5-<10  9 500  20 700  3 300  7 600  3 900  0  1 400  800  400  300  47 600 
10-<20  6 400  32 000  14 400  60 600  12 300  5 600  1 900  3 600  1 000  1 300  138 600 
20-<30  15 100  18 900  9 300  61 400  19 800  14 100  10 400  2 900  9 400  3 900  164 800 
30-<40  8 900  23 600  20 900  65 900  27 400  29 100  17 500  16 800  22 500  16 100  248 300 
Column total  44 500  104 700  47 900  202 400  65 000  49 800  32 000  24 300  33 200  25 100  628 500 
Cumulative proportion (%) 7.1 23.7 31.3 63.5 73.9 81.8 86.9 90.7 96.0 100.0  
 Total monthly individual income by category, allowing for 75% under-reporting 
Number of hours usually worked R1-149 
R150-
309 
R310-
399 R400-799 R800-1199 
R1200-
1799 R1800-2499 
R2500-
4999 
R5000-
9999 R10000+ Total 
0-<5  1 900  3 800  8 600  1 100  6 100  1 900  300  1 900  300  3 800  29 300 
5-<10  1 200  11 200  9 600  13 900  3 600  5 400  300  1 400  800  700  47 600 
10-<20  1 200  12 900  15 800  39 100  31 300  25 400  3 600  3 900  3 600  2 200  138 600 
20-<30  1 700  16 600  9 300  26 700  37 900  28 500  13 600  14 900  5 300  10 700  164 800 
30-<40  0  13 900  10 200  46 100  31 200  40 000  20 300  33 300  22 400  31 300  248 300 
Column total  5 800  58 200  53 300  126 700  110 000  101 000  37 900  55 400  32 200  48 400  628 500 
Cumulative proportion (%) 0.9 10.2 18.7 38.8 56.3 72.3 78.4 87.2 92.3 100.0  
Source: Estimated from data for September 2004 LFS. 
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Table 7 No. of people who wish to work longer hours by income category by number of hours usually worked per week – Sept 2004 
 
 
 
 
 Among the 146-odd thousand working between 5-10 hours weekly, about 
one-third want to work for longer, while a slightly larger proportion of 
the 358 000 people working between 10-20 hours would like to do so. 
Viewed in the context of the 12 million people working, the problem of 
people working fewer hours than they would like, is relatively small—
only about five percent of the employed who work less than a standard 
(40-hour) week, want to work more hours. That does not mean that it can 
be ignored, about 40 percent of the 600 000 people concerned are likely 
to be very poor. 
 
The problem posed by the fact that some people work fewer hours than 
they would wish to is, however, dwarfed by the problem of low incomes. 
Somewhere between 3-6 percent of workers, for example, do not earn 
enough to support one person at the exceedingly modest level of R309 
per capita per month. Somewhere between 20 and 35 percent are earning 
less than the amount required to support three people and so on. Clearly, 
by making the income category boundaries equal to multiples of whatever 
poverty line is accepted, one could say interesting things about the 
relationship between earnings and poverty. 
 
So much for employment―let us turn now to the unemployment 
numbers. 
 
How should changes in unemployment be evaluated? 
Unemployment rates are the captives of the two variables that go to make 
up the economically active population, the employed, and those deemed 
to be unemployed. As has been noted above, unemployment can rise 
during periods of fairly rapid job growth. Between September 2004 and 
September 2005, if we exclude informal agricultural workers, 
employment grew by 750 000 and the number of officially unemployed 
went up by 350 000. The official unemployment rate that corresponds to 
this definition of employment would have gone from 26.9 to 27.3 percent. 
Clearly, viewed alone, the latter two measures do not provide much 
useful information about labour market conditions. 
 
When to this is added the problems of deciding how to treat informal 
economy workers, especially those engaged in agriculture (there are 
almost as many problems involved in simply omitting them from the 
picture, as there are when they are included), it is clear that ways of 
supplementing the meagre information embedded in unemployment rates 
and headcounts need to be found. 
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 What is required is a way of thinking about changes in both the numbers 
of officially unemployed and discouraged56 workseekers recorded by the 
Labour Force Surveys that begins to address the inadequacies of these 
numbers, as currently presented. The three-by-three table in Figure 1 
below offers an approach to the problem which relegates unemployment 
rates to their appropriate (low priority) status, focusing instead on the 
relationship between changes in the absolute numbers of officially 
unemployed, and discouraged workseekers. 
 
Complicating the issue is the fact that changes in unemployment levels, 
whether measured as changes in rates or changes in absolute numbers, do 
not lend themselves to simple interpretation. Paradoxically, an increase in 
the official unemployment rate and the number of officially unemployed 
may be regarded as positive under certain circumstances. If employment 
is growing quite rapidly, and the number of discouraged workseekers is 
falling, presumably because the previously discouraged have received 
information that search activity may now be worthwhile, a surge in the 
number of officially unemployed could point to an increase in that 
activity.57 If, by contrast, employment levels are static, then a change of 
the sort just described should be viewed as negative, one possible 
explanation being that while some of the discouraged simply give up 
altogether, increasing levels of desperation drive others among them to 
seek work despite the difficulties of doing so.58 In short, we need a way 
of incorporating changes in the levels of employment into the set of 
outcomes captured in the nine cells that go to make up Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 Acceptability of changes in unemployment levels 
  No. of officially unemployed 
  Rises Stationary Falls 
 Rises 1. Worst case 2. Unacceptable 3. Less tolerable?
No. of discouraged 
workseekers Stationary
4. Unacceptable 5. Undesirable 6. Acceptable 
 Falls 7. Tolerable 8. Acceptable 9. Most desirable 
 
What is required of whatever means chosen to present the unemployment 
information, is some way off assisting users to form a judgement as to 
whether the outcome is good, bad or indifferent. There are few certainties 
in Figure 1―to begin the proceedings, a set of provisional judgements of 
the outcomes in the nine cells of the figure is offered. Agreement that the 
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 outcome depicted in the top-left-hand corner (cell 1) is the worst possible 
would probably not be difficult to secure. It is unclear, however, that the 
two outcomes labeled ‘Unacceptable’ (cells 2 and 4) are always so. If, for 
argument’s sake, employment levels were falling, to be able to hold 
unemployment (either official or expanded or both) stationary might be a 
considerable achievement. It is also not obvious that under conditions of 
rapidly falling employment levels, the outcome in the bottom right-hand 
corner, labeled ‘Most desirable’ (cell 9), actually merits that title. If both 
the searching and the non-searching unemployed had given up hope of 
finding a job, and were making a transition to not economically active, 
then the outcome would certainly not be the most desirable (although 
what could be regarded as desirable under such circumstances is not easy 
to say). 
 
Outcomes in other cells are also difficult to interpret (and hence, to be 
given an initial label). That in cell 3 is described as ‘Less tolerable’. It is 
so, in the first instance, by comparison with that in cell 7 which is labeled 
‘Tolerable’. Reference has been made above to a cell 7 outcome, showing 
how it is rational for previously discouraged workseekers to begin 
searching for work, driving the number of officially unemployed up, and 
the number of discouraged down. It is not easy, by contrast, to think of 
reasons to celebrate an increase in the number of discouraged. 
 
Clearly, to place the set of judgements offered in Figure 1 on a firmer 
footing, some means needs to be found of incorporating into the picture, 
employment changes and changes in participation rates. Since only one 
outcome per period is possible, the qualification of the judgement of the 
outcome has only to be made in the box in which that outcome is 
depicted. That qualification will (may) take the form of the supersession 
of the initial judgement by a more nuanced conclusion, after an analysis 
of all the relevant conditions has been performed. 
 
Table 8 Changes in employment & unemployment, Mar 2003-Sept 2007 (1000s) 
Period Employment
Officially 
unemployed Discouraged Cell 
March 2003 to Sept 2003  200 -680  530 3 
Sept 2003 to March 2004  0 -20 -10 9 
March 2004 to Sept 2004  160 -280  190 3 
Sept 2004 to March 2005  180  150 -130 7 
March 2005 to Sept 2005  570  200 -510 7 
Sept 2005 to March 2006 -220 -210  370 3 
March 2006 to Sept 2006 520 120 -470 7 
Sept 2006 to March 2007 -80 -60 290 3 
March 2007 to Sept 2007 710 -390 -80 4 
Source: Estimated from Labour Force Surveys for the relevant periods. 
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 Using this approach, we can quickly develop a rough-and-ready analysis 
of the performance of the economy. Table 8 above presents the required 
basic data for doing so, from the survey for the period March 2003 until 
that of September 2007. 
 
Over the period, official unemployment falls on six out of nine occasions, 
so the outcomes must be in cells 3, 6 or 9 of Figure 1. It rises on three 
occasions, implying that the outcomes will be in cells 1, 4 or 7. We need 
not look at each movement; a few illustrations will be sufficient to make 
the point. Let us assume, even though we know it not to be so, that each 
movement is statistically significant. Between September 2003 and 
March 2004, both official unemployment and the number of discouraged 
fell, a performance that is located in cell 9. Employment growth, 
however, was zero. Both official and expanded participation rates fell. 
That being so, would one still want to describe the performance as ‘Most 
desirable’? One rather suspects not―‘Acceptable’ or ‘Tolerable’ in the 
short-term, are possibly more appropriate ways to describe it. A repeat 
performance of this nature would be cause for some alarm. 
 
The half-year that follows (March 2004 to September 2004) sees growth 
picking up, official unemployment falls, and the number of discouraged 
rises, but by less than the number of officially employed falls, leaving us 
in cell 3, with a nominally ‘Less tolerable’ rating. The relative sizes of the 
movements in unemployment would incline us to qualify our judgement, 
and pronounce the performance ‘Acceptable’. 
 
Performance for the period from September 2004 to March 2005 lands us 
in cell 7 ‘Tolerable’, a judgement that we may wish to qualify to 
acceptable, if we could say with some certainty that that ‘new’ officially 
unemployed were drawn from the ranks of the existing discouraged. 
 
After a fairly dismal performance between September 2006 and March 
2007, during which a fall in the number employed and much larger 
increase in the number of discouraged workers is only slightly offset by a 
small fall in the number of officially unemployed, the improvement over 
the next period brings welcome relief. Not only do the numbers of 
officially unemployed and discouraged workseekers fall, the former by a 
whopping 390 00, but employment spurts by more than 700 000. The 
participation rate rises by a shade under one percentage point, while the 
absorption rate goes up by two percentage points. 
 
Two warnings have now to be issued. Both have been hinted at above. 
The first of them turns on the question of the statistical significance of 
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 changes such as those depicted in Table 8. Where, say, for example, an 
upward change in employment numbers is significant, and the changes in 
unemployment levels are not, it is probably safe to conclude that the 
change is desirable. In effect, we would be qualifying the outcome in cell 
5. If neither the changes in employment nor those in unemployment were 
statistically significant, we could apply the cell 5 provisional judgement 
of ‘Undesirable’ to the outcome. Statistically significant changes in 
unemployment, accompanying non-significant changes in employment 
would each have to be treated on their own merits. 
 
The second warning has to do with the question of who gets the jobs, and 
the kind of jobs they get. Although optimists might want to argue that for 
every skilled job created in the economy, there is a multiplier effect that 
sees, say, 2.7 semi-skilled or unskilled positions come into being (to 
pluck a figure out of the air), possibly with a lag, assertions of this kind 
often rest on shaky foundations. If our concern is with poverty 
eradication, we ought possibly to be much less impressed with 200 000 
skilled jobs finding their way into not-so-poor households, than we might 
be with the same number of unskilled jobs finding their way into poor 
households. In addition, since poverty is gendered, we ought as well to be 
looking for signs of gender bias in the jobs created among the poor. 
Finally, the question of whether or not the jobs are ‘decent’, in the sense 
that the ILO uses the concept (ILO, 2004), ought to be taken into 
consideration. Looking at just one aspect of ‘decent’ work, a secure, 
‘living’ wage, it is clear that the acquisition of low-wage, low 
productivity employment, though preferable to unemployment, can still 
leave the worker and his or her household mired in poverty with little 
chance of escape. 
 
Starting life as a relatively simple device for classifying various 
employment and unemployment outcomes, the analytical tool proposed 
above has grown in complexity pari passu with the complex reality it 
seeks to understand. Although sound-bites to meet the needs of those with 
short attention spans probably cannot be eliminated (some commentators 
will inevitably pander to this market), the analysis of developments in the 
labour market is too important to abandon to sensation seekers. If an 
analytical device such as that sketched above were to hand, it might be 
possible to stop politicians and others from saying unjustifiable things 
about the progress being made in the fight against unemployment. 
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 CONCLUSION 
 
From each of the two parts of this paper, a major conclusion may be 
drawn: from the first part, that Statistics South Africa’s decision to switch 
from bi-annual to quarterly collections of the LFS data is probably not a 
good idea, from the second, it may be concluded that a great deal could 
be done to improve the way in which the LFS (and GHS) results come to 
be collected, analysed and interpreted. Apart from a few general 
comments, the arguments offered in the text will not be rehashed below, 
instead, the recommendations made at various points will be listed. To 
justify any particular recommendation (there are many of them), it is 
necessary to refer to the appropriate points in the text. 
 
Part I 
That the quality of the information yielded by the LFSs needs to be 
improved, and can be so by improvements in the working conditions of 
the people who collect the raw data, admits of no doubt. The same cannot 
be said of the method proposed by Statistics South Africa of effecting 
these improvements. The attempted justification of the step as being in 
accordance with user needs has not been publicly defended by the release 
of any user documents that show how the additional information will 
contribute to policy-formation or decision-making. 
 
It is recommended that: 
 
The SARB and business economists who are modeling inflation be 
requested to write short papers describing what they believe the effect of 
a quarterly LFS data might be on the predictive capacity of their models, 
citing evidence of how improvements, if any, might take place. 
 
The SARB write a short paper showing how sensitive their composite 
indicators are to errors known to be present in the labour market 
indicators (discrepancies between LFS and QES figures, for example) 
they are presently using. 
 
In the near future that a review of the differences between the LFS and 
QES results be commissioned by the Statistics Council, and further, that 
the Statistics Council request from Statistics South Africa, a report on the 
health of the QES. The review of the QES should consider the 
implications, if any, of the differences in aggregate employment growth 
estimates in the QES and LFS. 
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 Research into the use of labour market indicators in the private sector, 
and in the financial press should be commissioned. 
 
Statistics South Africa place on their website all documents relating to the 
re-engineering of the LFS, including plans for the future of the surveys, 
along the lines of the information made available by the ONS when it 
responded to the review of its surveys. 
 
That in place of the occasional media release, Statistics South Africa 
describe in detail, the progress made in updating the business register. 
Analysis of the impact of the implications of not benchmarking the QES 
annually (as is done in the US) should also be conducted, and the results 
placed on the website. 
 
Statistics South Africa describes the technique for dealing with non-
response problems. It should discuss as well, how it deals (or intends to 
deal) with proxy response errors (which may be as large as non-response 
errors). 
 
A survey similar to the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey 
(JOLTS) conducted in the US be introduced in South Africa. The two 
questions on hires and separations in the QES are not adequate. The 
proposed survey should take into account the special conditions of the SA 
labour market, viz., mass unemployment coinciding with serious skill 
shortages. 
 
The bi-annual LFSs and the GHS be modified so that enough overlap to 
permit pooling of certain critical labour marker data is possible, and then 
to be carried out in a cycle, February (LFS), June (GHS), October (LFS). 
A review of the GHS questionnaire, aimed at discovering which 
questions can (should) be deleted and what additional questions are 
necessary, should be conducted. The household expenditure and social 
grants questions, deleted from the LFS, must be restored. The social grant 
questions need to be improved upon. The migrant module (suitably 
revised) in the 2004 LFS, should be tacked on to the GHS. 
 
Part II 
It is recommended that: 
 
More prominence must be given to non-farm total employment estimates 
in the LFS releases and media packs. The practice of including the wildly 
fluctuating ‘informal’ agricultural employment figures should cease 
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 forthwith. A revised set of official employment estimates, excluding these 
figures, should be published. 
 
The revised series should also present an up-to-date set of estimates of the 
size of the total and working-age populations. As better information has 
come to hand, Statistics South Africa has changed its mind on population 
growth rates in present times. There is no published series that backcasts 
the effects of these changes on population estimates over the period since 
the 2001 population census. 
 
Informal economy employment estimates are weak and there is no 
guarantee that quarterly LFSs will do anything to improve their quality. 
Statistics South Africa should re-introduce the Survey of Employers and 
Self-Employed (SESE), carried out in 2001. In the process, it might be 
possible to discover whether or not the considerably higher informal 
employment numbers posted by that survey were an outlier. New ways of 
measuring informal agricultural activity have to be discovered. The LFS 
is not an appropriate vehicle for doing so. 
 
Ways also need to be found to measure informal (and subsistence) 
agricultural activity. The LFS does not appear to be a satisfactory 
instrument for doing so. Consideration should be given to a re-run of the 
1997 Rural Survey, redesigned to suit today’s conditions. The focus 
should still be the former bantustan areas, but the survey should not be 
limited to these regions if that is found to be inappropriate. 
 
As a matter of extreme urgency, the task of matching survey responses so 
that up-to-the-minute longitudinal analysis becomes possible, must be 
carried out, and it must be done so out on a continuing basis. The 
ostensible reason for conducting the LFS as a quasi-panel study, is to 
permit analysis of labour market dynamics. Among the most urgent 
questions that presently cannot be answered is that of who has been 
obtaining employment as economic growth has speeded up in recent 
times. 
 
Qualitative research into the determinants of labour force participation 
should be conducted. 
 
Greater use could possibly be made of educational data collected by the 
LFSs. A review aimed at discovering how this may be done should be 
commissioned. 
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 Similar considerations apply to networking, believed to be an important 
determinant of successful job search. Ways need to be found to probe this 
area. 
 
Electronic publishing is rendering old methods of disseminating 
information obsolete. A review of the information published in the LFSs 
and the manner in which that is distributed should be undertaken. This 
should take into account the differing needs and capacities of the various 
users of the information. Innovative ways of making a limited, but 
essential subset of the information available to users should be sought. 
 
Finally, consideration should be given to the institution of structured 
ways of understanding the significance of the related changes between 
unemployment, employment and economic participation. The device 
suggested in the last section of the paper offers a starting point for 
discussion of this issue. 
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APPENDIX 1 INFLATION OUTLOOK: APRIL 2006-JANUARY 
2008 
 
Selected statements by the Monetary Policy Committee of the South 
African Reserve Bank 
 
2006-04-13 
 
The outlook for inflation 
 
The inflation outlook remains benign, although there are significant risks. 
The most recent central forecast of the Bank is similar to that seen at the 
February 2006 meeting of the MPC. According to the forecast, inflation 
is expected to peak at a level just below 5 percent in the first quarter of 
2007, and then decline to a level of around 4,6 percent, and remain there 
till the end of the forecast period in 2008. 
 
2006-06-08  
 
The outlook for inflation 
 
Compared to the previous forecast of the Bank, the latest forecast shows a 
marked deterioration in the inflation outlook, particularly in the short 
term. Whereas the previous forecast projected CPIX inflation to peak at a 
level just below 5 percent in the first quarter of 2007, it is now expected 
to breach the upper end of the target range and to peak at a level of 6,2 
percent at that time. CPIX inflation is then expected to fall back below 
the upper end of the target by the next quarter, and by the third quarter it 
is projected to decline further to 5,2 percent. Inflation is then expected to 
continue to moderate gradually to reach 4,8 percent by the end of 2008. 
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 The main reason for the deteriorating outlook is a significant upward 
revision of the international oil price assumptions. 
 
The most recent inflation expectations survey of the Bank conducted by 
the Bureau for Economic Research at the University of Stellenbosch 
shows that expectations for 2006 have remained more or less unchanged, 
although there has been a slight deterioration in expectations for 2007 and 
2008. The revisions were mainly a result of an upward adjustment of 
expectations of trade unionists, and this brought them in line with the 
expectations of analysts and business executives. Inflation is now 
expected to average 4,9 percent in both 2007 and 2008, compared to 
expectations in the first quarter of 2006 of 4,6 percent and 4,8 percent for 
these two years respectively. These expectations are in line with the 
inflation expectations as indicated in the long-term break-even inflation 
rate, measured as the yield differential between conventional bonds and 
inflation-linked bonds, which measured 4,8 percent at the end of May 
2006. 
 
2007-12-06 
 
The outlook for inflation 
 
The most recent central forecast of the Bank indicates a further 
deterioration in the inflation outlook, particularly in the short term, when 
compared to the previous forecast. CPIX inflation is now expected to 
peak at around 7,8 percent in the first quarter of next year. Thereafter 
CPIX inflation is expected to decline to below the upper end of the target 
range by the final quarter of 2008. A gradual downward trend is expected 
to persist and to measure 5,2 percent in the final quarter of 2009. The 
higher trend is a result of higher administered price assumptions, 
particularly for petrol and electricity over the forecast period. 
 
2008-01-31 
 
The outlook for inflation 
 
The most recent central forecast of the Bank indicates a further 
deterioration in the inflation outlook in the short term when compared to 
the previous forecast. CPIX inflation is still expected to peak in the first 
quarter of 2008 but at an average of around 8,5 percent. In line with the 
previous forecast, CPIX inflation is then expected to decline to below the 
upper end of the target range by the final quarter of 2008 and to remain 
around the 5,6 percent level for most of 2009. The higher near-term 
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projections are a result of slightly higher inflation outcomes, and further 
revisions to assumptions about administered prices. 
 
 
ENDNOTES 
 
                                                 
1 Thanks are due (once more) to Anna McCord for giving generously of 
her time to make critical comments on Version 2 of the paper. Making the 
corrections she suggested took quite a while longer than she said they 
would, due in no small measure to the confusion (of mine) that she 
uncovered. Ideas in the paper were also shared with Murray Leibbrandt 
and Ingrid Woolard, both of whom made useful suggestions. Dori Posel 
read the Version 4 final draft, offering a stream of pertinent comments, 
not to mention the many typos she discovered. As ever, the errors that 
remain are my responsibility. 
On 13th July 2007, Version 2 of the paper was presented to the Executive 
Committee of Statistics South Africa, senior staff members and a member 
of the ‘triumvirate’ of consultants who advise Statistics South Africa on 
economic statistics, amongst them, the Labour Force Surveys. I am 
deeply grateful to the Statistician-General, Mr Pali Lehohla, and to those 
who attended (all of whom face extreme demands on their time) for 
making that meeting possible, and for responding to the criticisms offered 
in the paper in such a positive way. 
Thanks go as well to Johan van der Heever, head of economic research at 
the South African Reserve Bank, who read and commented on Version 3. 
His assurance that the Bank is not the source of pressure for an increase 
in the frequency of the LFS, leaves the claim by Statistics South Africa 
that the move is in response to user demand looking more than a little 
threadbare. No doubt certain users have been vociferous in the clamour 
for more frequent labour market information. Mere noise, however, 
cannot justify the expenditure of the very large sums of money involved. 
 
2 In a paper published last year, I argued that: ‘The goals of halving 
unemployment and poverty by 2014 are both too modest and too 
ambitious. They are too ambitious because the policy tools proposed to 
achieve them are unlikely to succeed. They are too modest because even 
if they are achieved, levels of poverty and unemployment will still be 
unacceptably high.” (Meth, 2007, p.104) There does not seem to be much 
reason to alter this conclusion. 
 
3 This estimate was produced by projecting the 2003-2007 labour market 
performance, using the September 2007 LFS results as base. The results 
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are sensitive to variations in the assumed rate of growth of the labour 
force, but less so to differences in assumptions about the rate of growth of 
the working age population. Chopping the former from the 2.083 percent 
per annum observed over 2003-2007, to 1.5 percent per annum, reduces 
the number of jobs required to about 450 000 per annum. At the end of 
the period (2014), there would still be between 2-7-2.8 million officially 
unemployed. Halving the rate of unemployment would thus mean 
reducing the number by 37-40 percent. 
 
4 See the article “Mboweni: Inflation remains a key challenge” (picked up 
from Reuters) in the Mail & Guardian online version, 4 April 2008. 
 
5 Treasury’s 2008 prediction for growth in the medium-term is 4.3 
percent per annum. See Budget Review 2008, p.2. The Harvard team 
looking at growth constraints as part of AsgiSA, concluded that potential 
output growth is in the region of 3-4.5 percent per annum (Frankel and 
Sturzenegger, 2008). As conditions worsen, short-term predictions 
become more dire. Debating whether or not the economy was sliding into 
recession (negative growth for two successive quarters), economists 
disagreed, as usual. An article by Roy Cokayne, under the headline 
“Recession to hit by October - FNB” (Business Report, Thursday, July 3 
2008, p.17), records dissenting views with some arguing that it is sliding 
into full recession, while others claim that fixed investment will cushion 
the economy into a mere slowdown. One of the optimists forecast growth 
of 2.7 percent this year, compared with last year’s five percent. 
 
6 After testimony by US Federal Reserve Bank Chairman Ben Bernanke 
before the Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, on 2nd April 2008 
(see http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/ 
testimony/bernanke20080402a.htm), articles appeared in the financial 
press noting that Bernanke had conceded for “the first time [that] the U.S 
economy may slip into recession”. See, for example, the Reuters piece by 
Mark Felsenthral “Bernanke: Recession possible, growth to rebound”, 
Downloaded from 
http://biz.yahoo.com/rb/080402/usa_fed_bernanke.html?.v=15, 6th April 
2008. Earlier reports of deteriorating economic conditions pointed to a 
‘slashing of growth forecasts, along with a raising of the unemployment 
forecast. In February 2008, for example, the article “US Fed slashes 
growth forecasts” run by the BBC on 20th February 2008 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7254969.stm,). The Bernanke 
testimony on 2nd April 2008, explains why it was deemed appropriate to 
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rescue Bear Stearns bank. The statement is worth repeating 
verbatim―Bernanke said that: 
“The company’s failure could also have cast doubt on the financial 
positions of some of Bear Stearns’ thousands of counterparties and 
perhaps of companies with similar businesses. Given the current 
exceptional pressures on the global economy and financial system, the 
damage caused by a default by Bear Stearns could have been severe and 
extremely difficult to contain. Moreover, the adverse effects would not 
have been confined to the financial system but would have been felt 
broadly in the real economy through its effects on asset values and credit 
availability. To prevent a disorderly failure of Bear Stearns and the 
unpredictable but likely severe consequences of such a failure for market 
functioning and the broader economy, the Federal Reserve, in close 
consultation with the Treasury Department, agreed to provide funding to 
Bear Stearns through J P Morgan Chase.” 
 
7 For a review of the prospects, see the article “Banks retreat from risk as 
credit crunch spreads”, by Ashley Seager in the Guardian (online 
version) Thursday April 3 2008; or “The week the crisis hit home”, by 
Graeme Wearden, also in the Guardian (online version) Thursday April 3 
2008. 
 
8 In the aftermath of the collapse of Northern Rock in the UK, it was 
pointed out that “Financial Services Authority [the regulatory authority] 
admits it did not have a clue” (article by Phillip Inman in the Guardian, 
Thursday, March 27 2008). Inman notes that the “bank’s business model 
… has been described as reckless”. 
 
9 Gieve does not talk so bluntly―he refers instead to the need to “alter 
the adverse incentives that had developed”. 
 
10 Views on prospects for the SA economy are, however, mixed. 
According to Wiseman Khuzwayo in an article headed “Deficit puts SA 
at risk World Bank says”, (Business Day online edition, March 30 2008), 
notwithstanding the warning about the deficit, the Bank expects growth 
of 5.1 per cent this year and 5.3 percent next year. 
 
11 As Appendix 1 to the present paper shows, the Reserve Bank’s 
Monetary Policy Committee believed that by the final quarter of 2008, 
inflation would be below the upper bound of the inflation target. It is not 
obvious that the Committee’s over-riding optimism, expressed with each 
increase in the repo rate, is entirely appropriate. At the time of writing 
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(shortly before the April 2008 meeting of the Bank’s Monetary Policy 
Committee), columnists could be seen offering advice to the committee 
and/or making predictions. Some, like Alex Pestana in Business Day 
(online version, 31 March 2008) urged courage “Not time for Bank to 
blink in its battle with inflation”. Others, like Mariam Isa in the same 
paper, trying to guess at how the committee may tackle a difficult task, 
argued that the “Rates decision [was] too close to call” (Business Day 
online version, 7 April 2008). 
 
12 According to the South African Reserve Bank’s figures (Series 
KBP7085J), percentage changes in output volume from the previous year 
were as follows: 2003, -1.9: 2004, 4.3: 2005, 3.9: 2006, 4.9: 2007, 4.1. 
 
13 Contributions to total output and employment were estimated 
respectively from the South African Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin, 
December 2007, p.S-105, and the Labour Force Survey for September 
2006, Statistical release P0210, 29 March 2007, p.vi. 
 
14 In support of this claim, the article says that official data show that the 
sector lost 22 000 jobs in 2007, 7000 of them in the final quarter. The 
figures cited here must be those from the Quarterly Employment 
Statistics (QES) survey for December 2007 (Statistical release P.0277, 27 
March 2008, p.9). Measuring formal sector employment only, this total is 
contradicted by the Labour Force Survey estimates of the change in 
formal sector manufacturing employment between September 2006 and 
September 2007. As opposed to the QES’s 1 322 000 and 1 311 000, the 
LFSs offer us totals of 1 484 000 and 1 565 000, an increase of 81 000 
(Statistical release P0210, 29 March 2007, p.16, and 27 March 2008, 
p.16). 
 
15 News of these demands was reported by Ms Yandiswa Mpetsheni, who 
has overall responsibility for ensuring that the surveys take place, at a 
user workshop organised and presented by Statistics South Africa in 
Gordons Bay, 7 June 2007. One forum in which these demands were 
articulated was a user workshop held in March 2006. The claim that user 
demands lay behind the decision, was repeated by several of those who 
attended the presentation I made to Statistics South Africa, on 13th July 
2007. 
 
16 Supplied to me by Dr Rashad Cassim, DDG, Economic Statistics, 
Statistics South Africa, 3rd April 2007. 
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17 In a footnote in the document, a leading indicator is defined thus: 
“… the phrase “leading indicator” is intended to refer to the fact that the 
RLFS [Re-engineered LFS] will enable policy makers to anticipate what 
the subsequently available data from other sources will show.” 
 
18It may be easier for government to respond to an overheating of the 
economy caused by growth outstripping supply capacity. 
 
19 Elsewhere, even if fairly significant swings in the labour market are 
detected, apart from monetary policy changes, there is precious little 
scope for policy intervention in the short-term (stabilisation policy). Even 
when there is scope for intervention, the time that elapses before any 
impact is felt, could be very long. Svennson (2000, p.1), for example, 
argues that: 
“Because of the lags in the effects of monetary-policy actions on 
aggregate demand and inflation, the Eurosystem cannot affect current 
inflation and output, nor inflation or output in the near future. A rough 
benchmark is that monetary policy affects output in about a year and 
inflation in about two years.” 
If South Africa is anything like the European Union in this regard, then, 
unless it can be shown that one or more of the labour market indicators 
performs exceptionally well, there would seem to be little virtue in 
attempting to pump up the LFS to use as a guide. 
 
20 See McCord and Meth, 2007 for an analysis of the limitations of the 
EPWP. 
 
21 Displaying a fine disregard for evidence the ANC’s claim that “We are 
building a developmental state and not a welfare state given that in 
welfare state (sic), dependency is profound.” (ANC, 2007, paragraph 36, 
p.13), ignores the fact that properly designed welfare benefits do not 
create dependency. 
 
22 For a review of labour market indicators that could be used by 
monetary authorities for understanding inflationary pressures, see Cassino 
and Joyce (2003). 
 
23 The substitute for democracy, the Monetary Policy Committees found 
in several countries, may not be all that inferior. A literature is starting to 
emerge on the nature of the interactions of the members of such 
committees. See, for example, Österholm, 2006. 
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24 pers. comm. Dr Johan van der Heever, South African Reserve Bank, 
26th November 2007. 
 
25 Go to www.statcan.ca/cgi-
bin/imdb/p2SV.pl?Function=getSurvey&SDDS=1601&lang=en&db=IM
DB&dbg=f&adm=8&dis=2#b2 
 
26 Fixed-date vacations can have a “major impact” on the (Canadian) LFS 
results. Galarneau, Maynard and Lee (2005, p.9) point out that 
construction worker vacations in Quebec were picked up in the 2003 but 
not in the 2000 LFSs, thus accounting for some of the apparent 
differences in the length of the work week. 
 
27 The origin of the estimates of overtime hours could not easily be 
tracked down. One possible source is the LFSs, which ask for total hours 
worked including overtime. By assuming a standard week of some 
duration, say, 40 hours, an estimate of overtime hours may be obtained. 
 
28 Upper and lower limits of the confidence intervals for total 
employment (about 13 million people) and official unemployment (about 
four million individuals) in September 2007 are respectively about 3.3 
and six percent. See Statistical release P0210, 27 March, 2008, p.xxviii. 
 
29 When the apartheid regime finally got round to taking the problem of 
unemployment seriously (in 1978), it too, conducted a monthly current 
population survey. Despite attempts to refurbish the surveys in the early 
1980s, its results were so clearly out of touch with reality that it was 
abandoned in about 1986. 
 
30 An indication of how hard it is to produce good statistics is provided by 
the fact that the CES is benchmarked each year! Some of the sectoral 
changes are quite large. See Eickman, 2007. 
 
31 Differences are also found between survey and administrative data. 
See, for example, the paper by Næsheim and Pedersen (2007) on this 
phenomenon in Norway. 
 
32 There are also significant differences in the UK between population 
census and LFS indicators. See Heap (2005). 
 
33 The response of the ONS to the recommendations in the review was to 
publish for comment, a set of intended changes to the surveys (ONS, 
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2007a). Some of them are quite radical, e.g., changing the WFJ from a 
monthly to a quarterly survey. This was followed a little while later by an 
implementation programme for the proposed changes (ONS, 2007b). The 
contrast between the ONS’s handling of this review, and the way in 
which Statistics South Africa has handled the re-engineering of the LFS, 
following the review of that survey, does not cast the latter institution in a 
very favourable light. 
 
34 It is interesting to note that the measure is merely ‘reasonable’, not 
robust, or outstanding, or anything more exalted. Given the problems in 
the surveys referred to above, such modesty is fitting. 
 
35 See QES questionnaire. The most recent consulted was that for March 
2006 (on the Stats SA website). According to Mr Sagaren Pillay of 
Statistics South Africa (pers. comm., 8th October 2007), the questionnaire 
design has not changed since then.  
 
36 In its composite leading indicator, the South African Reserve Bank 
makes use of “Job advertisements in the Sunday Times newspaper: Six-
month smoothed growth rate” (Venter and Pretorius, 2004, p.68). 
Faberman (2005, p.2) is eloquent on the fact that the ‘job openings’ 
question in the JOLTS has removed dependence on similar indicators in 
the US, with their selection and measurement issues. 
 
37 The BLS considered disaggregating ‘hires’ into new hires, rehires and 
recalls, but did not do so because the added respondent burden was held 
to outweigh the benefits of collecting the extra information. 
 
38 One deploys the term ‘duality’ with more than a little reluctance, lest it 
lead to endorsement of hard-to-pin-down distinctions like the ‘first 
economy’ ‘second economy’ so beloved of the Presidency. 
 
39 There is something odd about the aggregate employment figures in the 
September 2006 LFS. For no obvious reason, they exceed by 60 000, the 
total of industry employment estimates drawn from the same source. This 
does not occur in any of the other September LFSs. 
 
40 End point selection is a problem, as ever, especially in the early days of 
the survey’s life, when informal sector employment estimates danced 
merrily to no particular melody (the February 2001 results, for example, 
are completely out of line with all other estimates). 
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41 Informal agriculture employment estimates really have no place in the 
total employment series―all they do is cause confusion. The press 
release for the March 2007 LFS, Statistics South Africa, by taking 
informal agriculture into account, downplays the job creation record (see 
Media Statement, 26th September 2007). The reported fall in informal 
agricultural employment from 704 000 in March 2006 to 460 000 in 
March 2007 (it stood at 473 000 in September 2006), may be a sign that 
further research is required―it cannot sensibly be incorporated into an 
analysis of the performance of the economy, its undoubted importance to 
those who rely on its outputs notwithstanding. 
 
42 For a critical user response to the quality of the informal economy 
employment estimates see the article “Stats SA must plug holes in labour 
force survey” by Neva Makgetla in Business Day (online version), 10th 
October 2007. 
 
43 Migration, the third of the demographic forces, is susceptible to current 
economic forces, and also to political forces. 
 
44 Disaggregating aggregate participation rates, one discovers changes 
within and between groups, some of which can be in opposite directions, 
as has been the case in many countries where, for example, men’s 
participation rates have fallen while those for women have risen. 
 
45 For details of the changed estimates of population growth rates see 
Statistical Release P0302, 31 May 2005, Table 7, p.10, and P0302, 1 
August 2006, Table 5, p.6. The changes, caused mainly by revised 
assessments of the impact of the AIDS epidemic, are substantial. Growth 
rates for the year 2004-2005 in the two publications respectively, are 0.92 
and 1.17 percent. 
 
46 For a discussion of the concept of ‘decent work’, and of South Africa’s 
performance in this regard, see Chapter 11 of ILO (2004). 
 
47 In order to understand the impact on poverty of job creation, it is 
necessary to know who moves out of unemployment or economic 
inactivity into work. This poses formidable problems for modeling. For 
an example of how this may be tackled, see Filho and Horridge (2004, 
pp.6ff). The model they use is more complex (by several orders of 
magnitude) than the simple device I built for looking at the halving 
question. Even so, they must still make heroic assumptions. 
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48 The form that networks take is known to be crucial. Wahba and Zenou 
(2003) build and test models of various types. These suggest that network 
density is an important determinant of success in job search. 
 
49 If subsistence agricultural work is excluded, as is done in Table 1 
above, employment grows from 10.745 million to 10.86 million, an 
increase of 115 000. Of these jobs, 35 000 were in the formal economy, 
50 000 in the informal economy, with the remainder being ‘Unspecified 
or Other’. None of these changes are significant at the 95 percent level. 
The confidence interval for the estimate of formal economy employment 
in March 2003 (7.322 million) ranged from 7.142 to 7.574 million (SR 
P0210, 23 September 2003, p.vii). 
 
50 pers comm., Ingrid Woolard, 19th April 2007. 
 
51 At present, users probably experience difficulty deciding which of the 
two surveys in each year, the March or the September, is ‘better’, 
whatever is understood by such a description. 
 
52 The ranking in Table 5 matches the distribution obtained by expressing 
the numbers of workers in the various income categories in Table 3.10 of 
the March 2007 LFS (P0210, 26 September 2007, p.25) as (row) 
percentages of the total number in that occupational category. Perhaps 
surprisingly, plant and machine operators and assemblers seem to be 
better paid, on average, than craft and related workers, who, in turn, 
appear to be better paid than sales workers. 
 
53 Among 4.3 million officially unemployed in March 2007, about 60 
percent, or 2.6 million had never ‘worked’ before. For the age cohort 15-
30 years of age this rises to 72 percent―1.97 out of 2.7 million. See 
P0210, 26 September 2007, Table 5.2, p.40. 
 
54 About 11.4 percent of African grade 12 candidates in former African 
schools obtain university endorsements, as opposed to 26.3 percent of 
Africans in other schools. The endorsement rate is highest among Indians 
(53.3 percent), followed by whites at 51.7 percent (van der Berg, 2004, 
p.31. 
 
55 Talk of improving the quality (amount) of information presented in the 
news releases raises the question of how many users still rely on 
(expensive?) paper copies of the survey results. Using Statistics South 
Africa’s Interactive data website facility, it is now possible to make 
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detailed cross-tabs of unpublished LFS results, while those who seek to 
dig even more deeply, can use the data CDs which now appear promptly 
(if anything, researchers are faced with an almost overwhelming flow of 
information). While any suggestion that paper copies no longer be 
published must discriminate against those without access to the internet 
(and broadband), it might be possible to disseminate the main results, 
e.g., employment and unemployment figures through the media, in 
sufficient detail to satisfy the immediate needs of those without computer 
access. Translation into some of the country’s other official languages 
could even increase the number to whom the information becomes 
available. 
 
56 There is an interesting terminological debate here which although it 
may sound a trifle pedantic, should, in the interests of rigour, be resolved. 
In the LFSs, Statistics South Africa refers to the non-searching 
unemployed as ‘discouraged workseekers’ (see, for example, P0210 27 
March 2008, pp.xixff). As Prof. Posel points out, however, the two are 
not the same. It is possible to infer ‘discouragement’ from the reasons 
given to the question in the LFSs about why people have not looked for 
work (or tried to start a business). Typically, three of these reasons: ‘No 
jobs available in the area’; ‘Unable to find work requiring his/her skills’, 
and ‘Lost hope of finding any kind of work’, are given by more than 
three-quarters of all the non-searching unemployed. In what follows, the 
term ‘discouraged ’ will be used, but it should be borne in mind that the 
term ‘non-searching unemployed’ is the more precise way of describing 
people who want to work but have not taken action to find it. 
 
57 Up-to-the-minute information on transitions is required, so that we can 
check to see if it is the previously discouraged who have changed status 
(have made a transition) to actively seeking employment, rather than 
dropping out of the labour market altogether, their place in the job queue 
being taken, possibly by others who were previously not economically 
active, e.g., because they are new entrants (school-leavers, graduates etc) 
to the labour market. 
 
58 In such circumstances, the absorption rate (number of workers divided 
by working age population), could fall. The participation rate as measured 
by the expanded definition, could fall as well. Actual outcomes depend 
on relative changes in the numbers of searching and non-searching 
unemployed. 
